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Specifically, this study examined the perceptions of 
working conditions for a sample of principals who had 
statutory authority to bargain collectively (Washington) and 
a sample of principals who did not have such authority 
(Oregon). This type of study can make a contribution to the 
knowledge base for educational leadership, administrative 
behavior and governance dynamics within educational 
organizations. 
Methodologically, this descriptive study utilized a 
survey research design. Survey research permits data 
gathering from a relatively large number of cases at a 
particular point in time. This research strategy focuses 
primarily upon the generalized characteristics of a population 
rather than individual characteristics. The population for 
this study were principals in Oregon (908) and Washington 
(1102) • The instrumentation for data collection was The 
School Principal's Working Conditions Questionnaire which was 
mailed to a sample of one hundred principals in Oregon and one 
hundred in Washington. The return rate for Oregon was sixty-
seven (67) percent and eighty (80) percent for washington. 
Seventy-three and one half (73.5) percent of the principals 
responded to the questionnaire. 
Nine sub-scales were used to measure determinants of 
principal's working conditions: 
of formal written contracts, 3) 
authority, 5) job security, 6) 
1) salary, 2) existence 
autonomy, 4) power and 
fringe benefits, 7) role 
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definition, 8) communications with superintendents and 
school boards, and 9) involvement in decision making. 
The data analysis compared responses of two principals 
groups; an analysis of variance was used to identify 
significant differences between the two groups means. A major 
conclusion of the study was that there was no significant 
difference in perceptions of working conditions for the two 
groups of principals. Of the nine determinants of principals' 
working conditions, only autonomy was found to be 
significantly more positive for non-bargaining principals. 
Non-bargaining principals (Oregon) perceived that they 
have greater autonomy in their management roles than do the 
bargaining principals. An explanation for this finding may 
be that Oregon Principals, although they have no impact on 
district collective bargaining processes, have a considerable 
amount of discretion in managing their schools and they have 
an impact upon teaching behavior and student learning 
outcomes. 
A secondary data analysis compared the level of 
bargaining - formal, informal, and unilateral decision making 
to nine determinants of principal's working conditions. This 
analysis found salary (.001), involvement in decision making 
(.03), job security (.013), and fringe benefits (.016) to be 
statistically significant. The group of principals who 
indicated they formally bargain had a significantly higher 
mean score than the informal collective bargaining or 
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unilateral decision making groups. This finding suggests 
there may be a positive relationship between adequacy of 
salary, formal collective bargaining, and higher levels of job 
satisfaction. 
wi th regard to involvement in decision making, job 
security and fringe benefits, the informal bargaining 
principals' group had a significantly higher mean score than 
the formal bargaining and unilateral decision making groups. 
The informal bargaining group perceived that they were 
involved in decision making processes more often or to a 
greater extent than principals in the formal and unilateral 
decision making groups. These decisions include policies and 
procedures which effect job security and fringe benefits. 
Consequently the higher scores for principals in the informal 
decision making group may be reflective of their participation 
in an inter-active "administrative team" model. 
This study's findings has implications for legislative 
bodies who are developing and/or amending collective 
bargaining statutes. In addition, the study's findings can 
inform local policy makers as they develop policies and 
practices for involvement of principals in matters which 
relate to working conditions. 
School district officials who have the responsibility for 
policy implementation can benefit from the knowledge that 
formalized collective bargaining (with the exception of 
possible salary issues) may not be as important as 
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establishing structures and processes for including principals 
in decision making. 
In summary, the major finding that there is no 
significant difference in perceptions of working conditions 
for the non-bargaining and bargaining principal groups, has 
powerful implications for the collective bargaining movement 
and for principals in the Northwest. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Collective bargaining has become an integral part of 
American public education governance. However, treatment of 
school supervisors and administrators in public education 
collective bargaining differs from private sector bargaining. 
Private sector supervisors and managerial employees are 
unrepresented in the collective bargaining process. 
Public school administrators in states, such as 
Minnesota, New York and Massachusetts (Pisapia, 1980), have 
engaged in collective bargaining, with statutory protection. 
Conversely, public education administrators in Florida, 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, have been denied the right to 
engage in collective bargaining by statutes which specifically 
exclude supervisors and administrators from the protection 
offered to teachers (Pisapia, 1980). 
The number of public school principals who collectively 
bargain has increased during the past decade (Nasstrom and 
Pier, 1983). Some observers believe the acceleration of 
administrative bargaining in public education will continue 
at its current rate of increase (Nasstrom and Pier, 1983). 
Twenty five years ago unions of administrators were non-
existent (Cooper, 1979) and the attitude and acceptance of the 
legitimacy of administrative collective bargaining was unified 
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against bargaining rights for administrators (Cooper, 1979). 
The number of administrator bargaining units is still on 
the increase in a few geographical areas. Recently, the 
Philadelphia Association of School Administrators voted to 
join the teamsters to "aid the principals in getting a fair 
and equitable contract" (Rodman, 1986). They have 
subsequently become locked in a dispute wi th the school 
district over a two year period on salaries and other 
concerns. Presently, Pennsylvania state law guarantees no 
right to administrative collective bargaining (Rodman, 1986), 
but does provide a legal right to strike. 
Oregon excludes supervisors from inclusion under its 
Collective Bargaining Act. This exclusion is accomplished by 
a description of those defined by the Act as public employees. 
The law describes a public employee as "an employee of a 
public employer but does not include elected officials, 
persons appointed on boards or commissions or persons who are 
confidential employees or supervisory employees" (State of 
Oregon, 1982). 
The law describes a Supervisory employee as: 
any individual having authority in the interest of the 
employer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, 
promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other 
employees, or having responsibility to direct them, or 
to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend 
such action, if in connection with, the exercise of such 
authority is not merely routine or clerical in nature, 
but requires the use of independent judgement. However, 
the function of authority enumerated in the sUbsection 
does not necessarily require the conclusion that the 
individual exercising that function is a supervisor 
within the meaning of ORS 240.060 (Oregon Revised 
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statutes, 1982, p. 37). 
In Oregon, supervisory status is not established by title 
in the law but by the specific functions of the position 
within the organization. A title in one school district may 
be a supervisory position whereas the same title in another 
district would not be a supervisory position. 
While Oregon excludes administrators' bargaining rights 
through the definition of public employee, a Washington state 
statute excludes only the superintendent, assistant 
superintendent and directors of business by definition. 
Washington state grants administrators, with supervisory 
authority, bargaining rights through inclusion within the 
definition of "public employee" (Pisapia, 1980). 
This statute prohibits "managerial II bargaining 
through categorical and definitional schemes. 
Washington statute does not exclude bargaining by 
administrators falling outside of these categories, 
nor does it provide specific definitions of 
supervisors, unless they fall outside of a 
bargaining unit. It only prohibits managerial 
bargaining through specific categorical exclusions 
(Pisapia, 1980, p. 68). 
The statute's purpose is to prescribe certain rights and 
obligations of the educational employees of school districts 
in the state of Washington, and to establish procedures 
governing the relationship between these employees and their 
employers. They are designed to meet the special requirements 
and needs of public employment in education (state of 
Washington, 1975, 1st ex.s.c 288 2.). The statute goes on 
to define the term "employee organization" to mean any 
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organization, union, association, agency, committee, council, 
or group of any kind in which employees participate, and which 
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, for collective 
bargaining with employers. 
The terms "employee" and "educational employee" 
mean any certificated employee of a school district, 
except: (a) The chief executive officer of the 
employer, (b) The chief administrative officers of 
the employer, which shall mean the superintendent 
of the district, deputy superintendents, 
administrative assistants to the superintendent, 
assistant superintendents, and business manager. 
Title variation from all positions enumerated in 
this subsection (b) may be appealed to the 
commission for determination of inclusion in, or 
exclusion from, the term "educational employee" 
(state of Washington, 1975). 
understanding the differences in working conditions 
between principals who choose, or are allowed, to bargain 
collectively and those who do not, may provide insight into 
the human relations of future organizational governance 
dynamics within education in the United states. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The role of school principals in a school district is 
that of middle manager. Yet, questions arise with regard to 
their status as management or supervisory personnel or 
something all together different. 
Middle level managers, in many school districts, do not 
have similar access to negotiated decision making as do their 
subordinates (teachers) who are involved in collective 
bargaining (Caldwell and Paul, 1983). This decision making 
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process with respect to wages, benefits and self-interest is 
an acceptable practice in a majority of public and private 
sector work places. Upper management (boards and 
superintendents) tend to hold more tightly to unilateral one-
sided decision making due to negative attitudes produced as 
an outgrowth of teacher bargaining. A heal thy organizational 
climate is premised on "trust" (Likert, 1967). Evidence would 
indicate principals excluded from direct input or 
participation in a process for determining wages and fringe 
benefits, will be less likely to accept and understand the 
motives and intentions of the school board (Caldwell, 1983). 
It seems incongruous that principals -- instructional 
leaders accountable for the welfare and educational growth of 
the nation's youth should in some school distr icts be 
excluded from meaningful participation in matters impacting 
directly on their personal welfare (Caldwell and Paul, 1983). 
Due process, according to Oregon and Washington state 
law, affords a level of job security to principals. Certain 
job requirements, e.g. teacher evaluation procedures, in which 
they have less direct input than the teachers, make contracts 
difficult to administer. Principals are evaluated and have 
less authority in developing the process and contract than 
their subordinates. Principals are "caught in the middle". 
They do not have direct access to formalized channels of input 
with their governing boards in defining the terms and 
conditions of their work. 
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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The most often claimed advantages to principals 
bargaining involves both personal and organizational benefits. 
Principals may receive higher salaries and better fringe 
benefits: more extensive employment rights: seniority 
provisions in case of lay-offs: better communication with the 
superintendent and the school board: greater authority on the 
job: and opportuni ties to achieve resolution on internal 
disputes through effective grievance procedures. Presumably, 
districts become more efficient and compatible organizations 
by their inclusion. 
Collective bargaining fails, according to some, in its 
organizational impact. Principals have less authority and 
greater breakdowns with superordinates in communication, as 
well as more conflict and greater difficulties in resolving 
disputes (Nasstrom and Pier, 1983). Proponents of the 
"administrative team" concept feel these to be the major 
victims of principals' rights to collectively bargain. The 
adversarial aspects of bargaining make achieving the purposes 
of an "administrative team" impossible. 
Collective bargaining for administrators in Oregon and 
Washington differs according to the statutes in place in each 
state. Comparing principals' perceptions of their working 
conditions through a sample of principals permitted bargaining 
rights and a sample of those not permitted such rights could 
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provide clearer direction to those involved in the 
establishment of state statutes affecting bargaining rights. 
In addition, this comparison may provide insight into future 
administrative structures for school districts in Washington 
and Oregon. 
This study examined the perceptions of public school 
principals in Oregon and Washington regarding their 
perceptions of working conditions and analyzed the 
relationships between principals' perceptions and the ability 
to collectively bargain. This study also investigated the 
degree of formality in bargaining and whether it impacts these 
perceptions. 
The perceptions of working conditions were determined by 
examining nine determinants: 
1. Salary - Adequacy of Salaries 
2. Formal Contracts - Existence of written 
contracts, policy statements, or memoranda of 
understanding and agreement 
3. Autonomy - Principals authority over teachers 
and school building activities 
4. Power' and Authority - Specific statements of 
principal's decision making areas 
5. Job Security - Specific seniority provisions, 
grievance procedures 
6. Fringe Benefits - Professional membership 
dues, paid and unpaid leave policies, and release 
for professional growth 
7. Role Definition - Statement of both the board's 
and principal's rights and responsibilities 
8. Communications with board/superintendent -
Effectiveness of principal's communication and 
ease of resolution of disputes between board/ 
superintendents 
9. Involvement in decision making - The extent 
8 
to which principals are involved in setting policy 
(Williams, 1985, p. 2) 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
For the purposes of this study, the following operational 
definition of major terms are: 
Collective Bargaining - the mutual obligation of the PUblic 
employer and the exclusive bargaining representative, to 
meet, confer and negotiate in good faith, and to execute 
a written agreement with respect to grievance procedures, 
and collective negotiations on personnel matters, 
including wages, hours, and working conditions which may 
be peculiar to an appropriate bargaining unit of such 
public employer (State of Oregon, 1982). 
Administrators public education officials with any 
responsibility for or having authority in the interest 
of an employer, to hire, assign, promote, transfer, 
layoff, recall, suspend, discipline, or discharge other 
employees, or to adjust their grievances, or to recommend 
effectively such action when such action is not merely 
routine or clerical in nature but calls for the 
consistent exercise of independent judgement (State of 
Washington, 1975, 1st ex.s.c 288). 
Principal - public education administrator with responsibility 
for a school building and all it's functions inclusive 
of the evaluation of certificated employees specifically 
elementary school principal, junior high or middle school 
principal and senior high school principal (State of 
Washington, 1975). 
Perceptions - awareness of the elements of the environment 
through direct or intuitive recognition; the integration 
of impression of events derived from past experience and 
serving as a basis for or as verified by further 
meaningful motivated action (Webster, 1986, p. 1675). 
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Working Conditions: 
1. Salary - Adequacy of Salaries 
2. Formal Contracts - Existence of written contracts, 
policy statements, or memoranda of understanding 
and agreement 
3. Autonomy - Principals authority over teachers and 
school building activities 
4. Power and Authority - Specific statements of 
principal's decision making areas 
5. Job Security - Specific seniority provisions, 
grievance procedures 
6. Fringe Benefits - Professional membership dues, 
paid and unpaid leave policies, and release for 
professional growth 
7. Role Definition - Statement of both the board's 
and principal's rights and responsibilities 
8. Communications with board/superintendent -
Effectiveness of principal's communication and 
ease of resolution of disputes between board/ 
superintendents 
9. Involvement in decision making - The extent to 
which principals are involved in setting policy 
(Williams, 1985, p. 2) 
HYPOTHESIS 
The research indicates collective bargaining for 
educational administrators is afforded to middle managers, at 
least in a permissive process, in school districts in thirty-
one (31) states (Cooper and Nakamura, 1983). Washington's 
statutes allow for this process, but Oregon statutes deny the 
formalized process. 
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For this study, it was hypothesized principals' 
perceptions of their working conditions do not significantly 
differ even though statutes regarding the collective 
bargaining rights of principals in both states differ greatly. 
The trend in public education is toward an increase in 
administrator collective bargaining (Bridges and Cooper, 
1976). This study provided additional insights into these 
issues for educators and legislators of other states who are 
also concerned with the phenomenon of administrative 
unionization within public education. 
SCOPE 
This study was limited to a random sample of public 
school principals (K - 12) in the states of Washington and 
Oregon who serve solely as building level administrators. The 
perceptions of principals rather than actual level of salaries 
and fringe benefits were studied. As Caldwell and Paul's 
(1983) previous evidence suggests, the process through which 
working conditions such as salaries are determined may be more 
crucial to the organization because job satisfaction is not 
always tied to monetary benefits. 
The sample for this study included one hundred (100) 
principals in Oregon and one hundred (100) principals in 
Washington representing a ten percent (10%) sample of the 
total popUlation available for study. 
Data for the study were collected between February and 
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March 1988. The research instrument, "School Principals' 
Working Conditions Questionnaire", developed orginally by 
Williams (1985) and Morris (1985) and combined for this 
investigation, was used for the data collection activities 
( See Appendix B). There are several 1 imi tat ions of this 
study: 
1. This study is confined to perceptions of the 
working conditions of school principals in the states 
of Oregon and Washington. 
2. To maximize a true representation of the 
population, principals surveyed were randomly chosen. 
3. No attempt was made to survey the perceptions or 
attitudes of school district top management with regard 
to principals' working conditions. 
4. This study only examines perceptions of working 
conditions by school principals and the effects of 
collective bargaining on their perceptions. 
5. This study did not examine the attitude of school 
principals toward collective bargaining, nor the 
effects of collective bargaining on principals' working 
conditions, nor the actual working conditions of 
principals. 
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SUMMARY 
This study focused on collective bargaining as a defined 
and structural approach affecting principals' perceptions of 
their working conditions and thus influencing the operation 
of their educational organizations. In many states, 
administrator groups have attempted to improve working 
conditions by lobbying for collective bargaining rights. 
Chapter I reviews how Oregon and Washington differ with 
regard to principals I statutory authority to collectively 
bargain and the perceived impact of collective bargaining on 
working conditions. Nine catagories of working conditions 
were defined and the concepts utilized in this study were 
operationally defined. 
In Chapter II, the historical development of the American 
labor movement is traced and specific studies related to 
collective bargaining and school principals are reviewed. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
INTRODUCTION 
organization theory and the history of the American labor 
movement have greatly influenced the right of school 
principals to organize for the purpose of collective 
bargaining. This chapter reviews this history and selected 
previous studies in this field. This chapter is divided into 
the following sections: 
1. Concepts of Organizations 
a. Working Conditions 
b. The Concept of Authority 
c. The Concept of Power 
d. Exchange Theory 
e. Early Collective Organization 
f. The Concept of Collective Bargaining 
2. The Historical Background of Collective 
Bargaining in the United states 
3. A Review of Federal Law Related to Federal 
Employee Collective Bargaining 
4. A Review of the Development of Collective 
Bargaining in Public Education 
5. A Review of the Development of Collective 
Bargaining in Oregon and Washington 
6. A Review of Research Related to Collective 
Bargaining and School Principals 
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CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATIONS 
Working Conditions 
Caldwell and Paul (1983) state Maslow (1954) and 
Herzburg's (1966) theories support the need for principals to 
achieve higher order need satisfactions. Maslow's theory is 
based on the idea that motivation is an internal force which 
cannot be imposed by external effort. People are continually 
seeking to satisfy a hierarchy of needs. Maslow states 
managers should strive to create an environment in which 
employees can achieve self actualization and the maximum 
effectiveness permitted by one's abilities and skills (Lutrin, 
1985). Frederich Herzberg found that contented workers derive 
satisfaction directly from job satisfiers and motivators. 
These motivators include the work itself as well as 
responsibility, achievement, recognition, advancement and 
growth. Unhappy workers found dissatisfaction from the job 
context and hygiene factors. According to Lutrin (1985) these 
factors relate to Maslow's lower levels of need (working 
conditions, interpersonal relationships, salary, status, job 
security) which must be satisfied before self actualization 
can be achieved (see Figure 1). When school boards openly 
discuss with principals and act on relevant concerns such as 
wages, role definition, autonomy and scope of authority, it 
may enhance in principals a greater sense of professional 
recognition and esteem (Caldwell and Paul, 1983). 
~ 
ACTUALIZATION 
ESTEEM 
BELONGINGNESS 
AND LOVE 
SAFETY 
Figure 1. Maslow's hierarchy of need. 
The Concept of Authority 
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Talcott Parsons defines authority as an aspect of power 
in a system of social interaction. It is institutionalized 
power over others (Parsons, 1954). 
Authority is a formal concept and comes from a formal 
organization (Hicks, 1967). From the basic definition of 
authority, as a right to act or direct the actions of others, 
two characteristics are given: (1) authority is a right and 
(2) as a result of possessing the right, one is entitled and 
obligated directly or indirectly to act. A third 
characteristic is implied and involves the power to employ 
penalties or sanctions so that a desired action is completed 
(Bierstedt, 1964). 
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The Concept of Power 
Power is a broad concept which is not necessarily 
confined to organizations. It is neither completely formal 
nor informal in nature, though it can be influenced by factors 
including an individual's ethical and moral considerations 
(Sisk, 1979). 
According to Max Weber, power is the probability that one 
actor within a social relationship will be in a position to 
carry out his own will despite resistance (Weber, 1947). "The 
ability to get things done the way one wants them to be done," 
according to Gerald P. Salanch and Jeffrey Pfeffer (Salancih 
and Pfeffer, 1977, p. 17). Power is the ability of a person 
to do something measured in terms of his or her ability to (1) 
give reward, (2) promise rewards, (3) threaten to withdraw 
current rewards, (4) withdraw current rewards, (5) threaten 
punishment, or (6) punish (Hicks, 1967). 
It is the realistic capacity of a system-unit to 
actualize its interests (attain goals, prevent undesired 
interference, command respect, control possessions, etc.) 
within the context of system-interaction and to exert 
influence on processes in the system (Parsons, 1954). 
Exchange Theory - Power and Authority 
At the base of self actualization are human needs and 
pleasures which have their roots in social life. Whether we 
think of power, professional recognition, or sociable 
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companionship, the comforts of family life or the challenge 
of competitive sports, the gratifications experienced by 
individuals are contingent upon the actions of others. The 
rewards individuals obtain in social associations entail a 
cost to other individuals, not to the point in which the gains 
of some depends upon the losses of others, but rather that 
individuals associate with one another because they all profit 
from the social association. They do not all profit equally 
nor do they share the cost of providing the benefits equally. 
The fact that furnishing benefits to others produces social 
rewards is a major reason people often go to great lengths to 
help associates and enjoy doing so (Blau, 1978). 
Individuals strive to achieve diverse objectives. The 
idea of selecting the most preferred among available 
alternatives does not imply the one chosen always yields the 
greatest material profit (Blau, 1978). Choice of an 
alternative that requires making material sacrifices but 
contributes most to the attainment of some ideal, may be their 
objective. Even in this choice errors may occur. The need 
to anticipate, in advance, the social rewards with which 
others will reciprocate in exchange relations inevi tably 
brings uncertainty and errors. Given this situation, the 
assumption that men seek to adjust social conditions to 
achieve their ends is realistic and inescapable (Blau, 1978). 
The basic social processes governing associations among 
people are rooted in simple psychological processes such as 
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the underlining feelings of people and their desires for 
various kinds of rewards. The psychological needs of 
individuals determines which rewards are important and to whom 
they are attracted. This mutual attraction depends on 
anticipating the association will be rewarding. The process 
of social attraction leads to the process of social exchange. 
This situation occurs frequently when one individual needs 
something another has to offer, such as help in work but has 
nothing the other needs in reciprocation for that help. The 
person in need of the recurrent services forces the other to 
help, gaining help from another source or getting along 
without the help. If unwilling to choose any of these 
alternatives, individuals must subordinate themselves to 
others and comply with their wishes, thereby rewarding the 
individual with power as an inducement for furnishing the 
needed assistance. 
Exchange processes give rise to differentiations of 
power. A person who commands services others need, attains 
power over others by making the satisfaction of their need 
contingent on their compliance. An employer can make workers 
comply because they are dependent on the wages received. 
There are differences in the dynamics of this power in a 
collective situation and the power of one individual over 
another. Collective approval of power legitimatizes power and 
its disapproval brings opposition. 
specific forms of social organization emerge as a result 
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of the process of exchange and competition in which the 
patterns of conduct by individuals and groups and their 
relations adjust. Power is the resource which makes it 
possible to direct and coordinate the activities of people 
(Blau, 1978). 
Stable organizing power needs legitimation and an 
important function of legitimate authority is to organize 
collective effort on a large scale in the pursuit of commonly 
accepted ends. Union organizations are designed to further 
the common objectives of their memberships. 
The organization of collective effort mobilizes power. 
Power can mean different things to different people, but is 
based on the action of people in social associations and their 
social exchanges. 
Early Collective organizations 
organization involves the coordination of collective 
effort. Man is by nature a political animal (Cresswell and 
Murphy, 1976). Political - that all men tend to gather in a 
"polis" , in a natural grouping where through a process of 
politics in a politz, to work out their policies. This 
assumes man is instinctively and by nature a herd animal, a 
creature of the polis, congregating compulsively with those 
of his kind (Cresswell and Murphy, 1976). 
In the ancient cities of Sumeria, the priesthood was the 
first class to organize, the warriors formed their "union" 
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called the nobility and the professionals organized the 
colegii: medicine, teaching, and law. 
also organized, especially among the 
aristocracy. 
Lesser occupations 
more skilled labor 
In ancient Mesopotamia, citizens working for the temple 
organized in groups. Among the early Hebrews, families 
employed in the same craft formed clans (guilds). In ancient 
Greece a craft belonged to a family or clan, and in Rome there 
were colegic of occupational groups that gave them force in 
time of need for safeguarding their common interests. In 
Medieval Europe, guilds were organized to aid members as they 
became more interested in economics. All of these 
organizations probably had grievances, complaints, work 
stoppages and social pressuring but the continuing reason for 
these organizations were the "communal compulsion" (Cresswell 
and Murphy, 1976) of the like to work together. In early 
societies with caste systems, the coming together or 
organizing of people in a craft or trade was relatively easy 
but in more fluid and open societies, such as the Uni ted 
states, the coming together of the "occupational clan" 
(Cresswell and Murphy, 1976) has been more difficult. 
Whenever any sector of the labor force becomes sufficiently 
aware of its collective presence and power, it sooner or later 
organizes (Cresswell and Murphy, 1976). 
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Collective Bargaining 
Under a historic concept of governmental sovereignty, top 
management was obligated to make use of a proper balance 
between the rights of its employees and the greater common 
welfare of the public. The engagement in the bilateral 
process of determining conditions and terms of work for middle 
management was discouraged (Caldwell and Paul, 1983). 
The suspicion that workers are unable to show sound 
judgement in issues and matters relating to their personal 
welfare as organizational climate becomes more structured and 
formalized, grows stronger as a consequence of the collective 
negotiations process and is not in alignment with research 
findings. The idea that the organization becomes increasingly 
strained, bureaucratic and adversarial and is not founded with 
current findings (Kanner, 1977; Karlitz, 1978, and Smith, 
1973). Caldwell's data appears to indicate perceptions of 
workers can be positively influenced through a collective 
bargaining approach. This approach should be mutually defined 
and structured, in establishing aspects of work relationships 
including monetary compensations (Caldwell, 1983). Sdxol 
principals, today, often experience doubts about their 
leadership style as our nation's schools suffer a serious loss 
of public confidence, as articles and studies have emerged 
about violence in the schools, drugs, and declining student 
achievement (Dwyer, et al, 1987). The school principal has 
been thrust into the very center of the troubled educational 
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arena by those who have studied "effective schools" (Edmonds, 
1979). The erosion of the public I s commitment makes it 
difficult for a principal to effectively manage a school. 
community factors such as lack of parental support for 
programs, lack of tax funds, and insufficient budget resources 
all reflect a decline of public confidence in the school 
system (Pinkey, 1980 and Williams, 1985). Goldhammer (1971) 
found principals complained their power and autonomy as school 
leaders has decreased (Dwyer, 1987). 
To counteract this loss of status and control, many 
principals have chosen to engage in collective bargaining 
activities, formed independent unions and even affiliated with 
the Teamsters and AFL-CIO (Williams, 1985 and Yeager, 1974). 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
The trade movement and guild charters during the 
Industrial Revolution following the Civil War are the 
precursors of collective bargaining in the united States. 
Labor shortages and the need for industrial expansion brought 
about the formation of labor organizations. Most early unions 
were poorly organized and short lived, especially during times 
of depression when any work was at a premium (Chamberlain, 
1965). 
In 1881, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was 
founded. The AFL was a group of skilled workers united to 
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promote higher wages, shorter hours, better working conditions 
and the right to collectively bargain. This union is a 
stronghold in the U. S • labor movement as it exists today. 
This union's membership, as well as other unions, grew until 
the great Depression of 1929 when a decline in American 
unionism took place. 
with the numbers of unemployed workers as a public 
concern, national attention focused on the formulation of 
several federal, long term labor policies. This focus was the 
basis for most of the major federal labor relations statutes 
generated and amended over the years. 
The act having the greatest effect on organized labor was 
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. This act provides 
protection of employee groups against employer influence and 
makes it unfair for an employer to refuse to bargain with the 
authorized representative of the employee. All of the laws 
beginning with the Railway Labor Act continuing through the 
Labor - Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 
continue to provide a basis for private sector collective 
bargaining and a legal basis for the relationship between 
employers and workers. 
As legislative labor activity increased in intensity, 
public employees demanded greater bargaining rights. The 
American Association of School Administrators (AASA) reported 
in 1966, that 110 (one-hundred ten) teachers' strikes occurred 
between 1940 and 1962. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy 
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issued Executive Order #10988, "Employee Management 
Cooperation in the Federal Service" which, was perhaps, the 
most important order in support of public employee bargaining. 
This order provided all federal employees the opportunity to 
bargain collectively (Hagburg and Levine, 1979). 
THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL LAW RELATED 
TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Executive Order #10988 did not exclude supervisor 
membership in labor organizations. The order guaranteed 
federal employees the right to join organizations of their 
choice, and these organizations were given informal, formal 
or exclusive recognition depending upon the proportion of 
eligible federal employees they represented. 
section 1 (a) of "General Provisions" of the Kennedy order 
read as follows: 
Each employee of the executive branch of the Federal 
Government has the right, freely and without fear of 
penalty or reprisal, to form, join, and assist a labor 
organization or to refrain from any such activity, and 
each employee shall be protected in the exercise of this 
right. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this 
Order, the right to assist a labor organization extends 
to participation in the management of the organization 
and acting for the organization in the capacity of an 
organization representative, including presentation of 
its views to officials of the executive branch, the 
Congress, or other appropriate authority. The head of 
each agency shall take the action required to assure that 
employees in the agency shall take the action required 
to assure that employees in the agency are appraised of 
their rights under this section, and that no 
interference, restraint, coercion, or discrimination is 
practiced within his agency to encourage or discourage 
membership in a labor organization (Hungeford, 1982, 
p. 9) • 
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Executive Order #10988 stated collective agreements are 
negotiated between representatives of federal employee groups 
and federal agencies relative to personnel policies and 
working conditions. The order also authorized arbitration of 
grievances and contract interpretation or application. It 
prohibited recognition to organizations which asserted the 
right to strike against the United states government. The 
Executive order was the impetus behind states and local 
governments' development of collective bargaining techniques 
(Lieberman, 1970). 
Those organizational and barganining rights were further 
advanced by another Executive Order, #11491, signed in 1969 
by President Richard M. Nixon. This order helped to 
coordinate, clarify, and strengthen Executive Order #10988. 
The major changes and additions related to an exclusive 
recognition election; definition of "good faith" bargaining; 
exclusion of supervisory personnel from joining an employee 
group; prohibition of union shop, agency shop or maintenance 
of membership; required financial disclosure; defined unfair 
labor practices. 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 established a 
Federal Service Impasse Panel for the purpose of impasse 
resolution; and established a Federal Labor Relations 
Authority to oversee the order's implementation (Hungerford, 
Bischof, 1986). 
The Railway Labor Act of 1926, the National Labor 
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Relations Act of 1935, The Executive order (along with the 
implemented state and local labor laws) and the civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978 provide the framework for collective 
bargaining in private and public sectors (See Figure 2). 
Law 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Process 
Private Sector 
Railway 
Labor Act 
(RLA) 
(RRs & 
airlines) 
1926 
1: Full 
collective 
bargaining 
rights 
National 
Labor 
Relations 
Act 
1935 
1: Full 
collective 
bargaining 
rights 
State And Local 
Government 
State & local 
collective 
bargaining 
statutes 
1: Established 
by state statute 
ranging from 
none to full 
Federal 
Sector 
civil Service 
Reform Act 
1978 
1: Limited 
right to 
bargain non-
economic 
issues: no 
right to 
strike 
Figure 2. Framework of labor law in private and public 
domain. 
REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 
The first formal association of educators was the 
National Teacher's Association. Its merger with the National 
Administrators group formed the National Education Association 
(NEA) (Cooper, 1982). As private industry labor strengthened, 
the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) was organized in 
1916 to secure bargaining rights for teachers (Lieberman, 
1970). Until the 1960's, the two organizations had some real 
27 
differences. One major difference was the AFT's exclusion of 
administrators as part of their membership, while the NEA 
allowed administrators to hold membership in the organization. 
While the AFT focused its emphasis on the economic status of 
teachers and proposed collective bargaining as early as 1935, 
the NEA focused its attention on improving teaching until 
1964. After the early 1960' s, the differences between the two 
organizations lessened and both were recognized as providing 
the necessary support to collective bargaining. As early as 
1961 in New York, and 1964 in Cleveland and Detroit, 
bargaining rights were won for these cities' teachers. In 
July of 1965, the Public Employees Relations Act (PERA) was 
passed in Michigan. By 1970, thirty-eight states had enacted 
some type of bargaining or meet-and-confer legislation. 
Collective bargaining in public education had become a reality 
(Lieberman, 1970). 
Presently, all public sector collective bargaining 
statutes authorize some form of bargaining by teachers and 
educational workers (Jascourt, 1984). Only in some areas of 
the South and West are there no bargaining provisions, 
although even in these areas some form of collective 
bargaining does take place. Most recently (1987), Illinois 
and Ohio enacted the most comprehensive collective bargaining 
provisions anywhere (Jascourt, 1984). Education reforms are 
not inconsistent with the principles underlying collective 
bargaining. The empowerment of teachers and principals wi thin 
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an educational organization cannot help but bring about 
reforms within educational organizations. 
REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN 
OREGON AND WASHINGTON 
Public employees in Oregon enjoy collective bargaining 
rights under the Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act 
(PECBA), (State of Oregon, 1982). PECBA was established by 
the 1973 Oregon Legislative Session, but forerunners of this 
comprehensive collective bargaining legislation were in 
existence since the early 1960' s (Hungerford and Bischof, 
1982). Oregon's first public bargaining law was adopted in 
1963 after unsuccessful attempts in 1959 and 1961. The 1963 
legislation was amended, and revisions in 1965 removed 
teachers from its coverage and established a separate 
framework for their representation. The 1973 PECBA 
encompasses coverage for all public employees, including those 
in school districts. This lawaI tered the Oregon school Board 
process related to making decisions with teachers about their 
working conditions. 
PECBA excludes supervisors from the provisions of the law 
and, therefore, principals are not included in bargaining 
units and are not represented in the collective bargaining 
process. Since its passage, there have been numerous cases 
in which the Employment Relations Board (ERB) applied the 
definition of supervisor to various administrative positions 
~. 
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and established a clear delineation of these positions. The 
supervisory status in Oregon is not established by title in 
the law but by the functions of the position within the 
organization. It appears clear the intent of PECBA is for 
public employees to receive the benefits of coverage to the 
greatest extent possible. The act also makes clear the intent 
of the legislature to exclude management (Thomas, 1981). 
Washington state's Public Employee Collective Bargaining 
Act (PECBA) went into effect in 1967 covering all public 
workers. state statutes originally covered toll bridge 
operators in 1961 and expanded to cover public utility 
districts in 1963 and teachers in 1965. The 1965 statute 
required collective bargaining for teachers with exclusive 
representation awarded. School districts and the State 
Department of Public Instruction were required to develop 
appropriate policies and rules. No provisions were made for 
unfair labor practices or strikes. The final PECBA, in 1967, 
provided mediation services by the state and was reviewed by 
the PECBA committee in 1971 to include modifications for 
greater efficiency of the law with amendments. The specific 
guidelines for collective bargaining for teachers and 
administrators is contained in the State of Washington: 
Revised Code of Washington Title 41: Public Employment, Civil 
Service and Pensions, Chapter 41.59. This Educational 
Employment Relations Act, prescribes the rights and 
obligations of educational employees of school districts of 
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Washington and establishes the procedures governing the 
relationship between employees and employers. These 
procedures are designed specifically for the needs of public 
employment in education. 
Chapter 41.59, Public Employees' Collective Bargaining, 
is consistent with Washington statute as a whole regarding 
bargaining. It provides for the continued improvement of the 
relationship between public employers and their employees by 
requiring a uniform basis of implementation of the rights of 
public employees to join labor organizations of their own 
choosing, and to be represented by organizations in matters 
concerning employment relations. 
REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR 
SCHOOL PRINCIPALS 
Attitudes, perpetuated and nurtured through time, are not 
readily dispelled even in the wake of clear evidence (Caldwell 
and Paul, 1983). This is the case with many of the present 
practices involving principals and school boards in the 
resolution of issues related to job function, and personnel 
policies and individual benefits. Resolving issues, 
especially those focusing on wage increment plans, fringe 
benefits and conditions of employment, are documented and set 
within an adversarial structure (Caldwell and Paul, 1983). 
Over the last twenty-five years some of the issues which 
stir the greatest controversy in the labor movement occur in 
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the public sector. The most unique of these are the 
collective bargaining rights of middle management personnel 
in education. 
with the signing of Executive Order #10988 (Hagberg and 
Levine, 1979), federal workers became eligible to bargain with 
management. Bridges and Cooper (1976) in examining existing 
state statutes, noted analysis of rulings by state labor 
commissions, phone interviews 
. 
with state officials, 
comparisons of teacher and administrator contracts, and 
reviews of the limited literature on administrative bargaining 
are the three maj or trends in collective bargaining for school 
administrators: 
1. The granting of bargaining rights to teachers 
is a necessary condition for granting similar 
rights to administrators. 
2. The eligibility of administrators for 
collective bargaining is more often determined by 
job junction than job title. 
3. The scope of negotiations is similar for 
administrators and teachers although the 
actual provisions of the negotiated contracts for 
the two groups show more striking differences than 
similarities (Bridges and Cooper, 1976, p. 307). 
Bargaining activity occurs in thirty-one (31) states 
(Cooper and Nakamura, 1983). Seventeen of these provide 
administrators access to the bargaining process through 
enabling legislation, including Washington. More than 90% of 
the administrator bargaining units are in seven states: 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Michigan, New Jersey, 
New York, and Washington (Bridges and Cooper, 1977). 
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As of 1982, collective bargaining between school 
principals and other mid-rank supervisors and school districts 
occurred in about two-thousand one-hundred (2,100) cases in 
thirty-one (31) states and the District of Columbia (Cooper 
and Murrmann, 1982). 
Theodore J. Kowalski in an article for The American 
School Board Journal (1978), suggests Boards of Education are 
pushing their administrators toward collective bargaining by 
supplying "unintentional incentives that may be spurring 
administrators into such actions" (Kowalski, 1978, pg. 35). 
Dr. Norman Barea, in a National Association of Secondary 
School Principals Bulletin (1978) suggests the following list 
of principals' concerns as leading to organizing: 1) Improved 
communications, 2) Securi ty , 3) Due Process, 4) Improved 
wages, 5) Procedures for resolving concerns, 6) Hours, and 7) 
Other conditions of employment (Barea, 1978, p. 44). 
From the point of view of collective bargaining, the role 
of school boards and teachers appears clear. The position of 
principals in relation to these negotiations, however, is not 
so clear. As a result, there is frustration among 
administrators who see negotiations going on around them, but 
rarely with them (Cunningham, 1968). Bargaining between top 
management and teachers, in which principals neither 
participate nor are committed, has steadily undermined their 
prerogatives. Forty-five (45%) percent of the principals 
participating in a study conducted by the NASB Journal staff 
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(Cooper, 1976) reported this one fact alone. 
It is not surprising the formal collective bargaining 
process has appeal to many principals. When viewing 
substantial gains in salary and other welfare issues made by 
teachers, principals feel anxious of the power and 
independence teachers develop through the collective 
bargaining process. Such results have appeal to principals 
who are not completely satisfied with their working conditions 
(Anderson, 1970). 
A study executed by the National School Boards 
Association in 1976 queried a cross section of U. S • and 
Canadian principals regarding labor relations. Forty-eight 
percent (48%) of those responding reported themselves as 
seriously at odds regularly or occasionally with their 
superintendent. Eighty-six percent (86%) reported being in 
favor of state laws which guarantee their right to bargain 
with a school board (Cooper and Nakamura, 1983). 
In a study of over five hundred districts in Michigan, 
LeCesne (1980) reported a positive relationship between 
principals and other school personnel in districts with formal 
negotiations. It concluded principals in formalized 
bargaining units view their relations with school boards, 
superintendents and other management personnel more favorably 
than those whose wages were determined through informal means, 
or who had no input into decisions. 
Based on a sample of over five-hundred (500) secondary 
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principals, LeCesne's findings suggest more than the actual 
level of salary, the process through which salaries are 
determined may be more crucial in predicting job satisfaction. 
Principals appear significantly more satisfied when they have 
input or consultation into their salary determination. One 
study determined and supported the notion that all input 
raises satisfaction levels over non participation roles 
(Caldwell, et.al, 1981). This suggests utilizing structural 
and formal elements in principal and board relationships 
increases the positive effects of job satisfaction for 
principals (LeCesne, 1980). 
In a Michigan study (Caldwell, et aI, 1981), which had 
a sample size of five-hundred (500) secondary principals, 
resul ts suggested the process through which salaries are 
determined is more crucial to predicting job satisfaction than 
the actual level of salary. A positive correlation between 
the degree of formalized interaction of principals with school 
boards in determining compensation policies and principals' 
perceived level of role satisfaction, were found to be 
consistent with the earlier work of LeCesne (1980). The 
LeCesne study was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of 
collective bargaining between principals and school boards. 
A study was conducted by Sweeney and Rowedder (1982), and 
surveyed principals in Iowa, where principal unions are 
prohibited by state statute and principals in Connecticut, 
where more than eighty (80) percent of school districts 
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bargain with administrators, to discover the range of 
attitudes toward administrator unionism. In Iowa, the 
majority favored formal collective bargaining believing it 
would enhance their leadership positions. A direct 
relationship was found to exist between principals I 
satisfaction with salaries and fringe benefits and their 
attitudes toward formal collective bargaining. principals who 
reported below-average salaries and benefits were strongly 
pro-union: those reporting above-average salaries and benefits 
were not. Secondary principals favored formal bargaining more 
than elementary principals, and principals with one to five 
years of experience were less supportive of unions than older, 
more experienced colleagues. 
In Connecticut, principals reported bargaining had 
increased their participation in decision making and that they 
had regained some authority. They noted improved communication 
with the superintendent and the board, clarification of their 
roles in the school system, increased job security, and 
enhanced salaries and benefits. They also indicated 
bargaining favorably affected their morale (Sweeney and 
Rowedder, 1980). 
A Nasstrom and Pier (1983) study compared bargaining and 
non-bargaining principals to ascertain granted employment 
rights and personal satisfactions with particular 
prerequisites of employment. A comparison was made on the 
basis of five contractual or related agreement rights and five 
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distinct aspects of personal satisfaction. The investigation 
of the contractual items rested on a null hypotheses that no 
significant differences existed between contracts of those who 
bargained and those who did not. This investigation of 
perceptions was guided by a null hypotheses that no 
significant statistical difference would exist. A stratified 
random sample was identified based on geographical and school 
district population information. The null hypotheses was 
rejected based on the findings relative to contractual 
differences. 
attitudes. 
No significant differences were found in 
In Pennsylvania, a state without legal mandate for 
collective bargaining, survey data were collected from three 
hundred secondary principals indicating seventeen percent 
(17%) had some type of formalized procedure for presenting 
self interest issues to school boards. Nineteen percent (19%) 
indicated some informal dialogue wi th their boards, while 
thirty percent (30%) had informal input only with their 
superintendents (Caldwell, 1983). On this basis thirty (30) 
percent of all principals were excluded from any type of 
dialogue with either their school board or superintendent in 
matters relating to wages or working conditions. Caldwell's 
study design employed a survey methodology with a 
questionnaire format. 
In a comparison study (Caldwell and Paul, 1983), an 
analysis of the actual agreements between middle management 
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and school boards in Pennsylvania was undertaken. In ten 
percent (10%) of the documents, principals were provided with 
specifically defined and written provisions relating to formal 
procedures for input into wage and fringe benefit policies. 
Caldwell and Paul concluded from this that many principals 
depend on verbal understandings and have little or no input 
into such decisions. These data suggest the relationships 
between school boards and their building managers 
significantly varies along a continuum ranging from active 
invol vement of principals relative to terms of employment 
resulting in a definitive written agreement, to unilateral 
settings of personnel policies passively accepted (Caldwell 
and Paul, 1983). Where private and federal sectors are 
governed by one legal framework, public school labor relations 
are controlled in at least thirty one states by collective 
bargaining statutes (Caldwell and Paul, 1983). The structure 
of the bargaining relationship has been precipitated by these 
state statutes. The statutes governing educational collective 
bargaining are diverse in nature. Currently, seven of the 
previous thirty-one states all deny administrators collective 
bargaining rights. 
The Pennsylvania study (Caldwell, et aI, 1981) confirms 
earlier research findings on principals' participation in a 
formally defined process for determining wages and benefits 
as consistently enhancing organizational climate and improving 
principal performance. 
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A study conducted in New Jersey and Pennsylvania with all 
building level administrators determined there was a 
significant relationship between the existence of collective 
bargaining for public school principals and their perceptions 
of working conditions. The study reveals principals involved 
in collective bargaining perceive they enjoy significant 
advantages over their non-bargaining counterparts (Williams, 
1985). This study identified nine determinants of working 
conditions and each of these were examined individually in an 
attempt to discover significant differences between the 
perceptions of bargaining and non-bargaining principals. One-
hundred (100) principals in New Jersey and one-hundred (100) 
principals in Pennsylvania were surveyed with a return rate 
of seventy-one (71%) percent. For analyses, mean scores were 
grouped and the T-test for significance was used between the 
two groups as well as an analysis of the variance when the 
three group means were studied. The results confirmed a 
higher degree of perceived satisfaction by principals who 
bargain as compared to those who did not bargain. 
In another study, (Morris, 1985) the results indicated 
principals organized for purposes of collective bargaining 
realize better defined working conditions than their non-
bargaining colleagues. This study was undertaken to determine 
if elementary principals organized for the purpose of 
collective bargaining possess better working conditions and 
enjoy greater job satisfaction when compared to those who are 
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not organized for purposes of collective bargaining. Research 
designed instruments were administered to two-hundred ninety-
seven (297) non-union and two-hundred fifty-four (254) union, 
randomly selected, elementary principals. Chi-square and T-
tests of significance were applied to the data collected. 
Collective bargaining did not insure greater job satisfaction, 
improved conditions of work or greater control of the 
principals job responsibilities. 
In a Minnesota study comparing bargaining and non-
bargaining principals, bargaining constituted a major vehicle 
in the granting of rights to principals. However, the absence 
of these rights did not result in dissatisfaction with rights 
(Morris, 1985). In these investigations, controls such as 
size of district and level of administration (secondary or 
elementary) were considered and found to have no significant 
impact on the findings (Nasstrom and Pier, 1983). 
The Morris (1985) and Williams (1985) studies illustrate 
the uncertainty surrounding an individual's perceptual versus 
actual differences in existing working conditions. 
principal's collective bargaining represents a major 
alteration in the power structure of American education. The 
findings are inconsistent about whether perceptual differences 
of working conditions exist between principals who bargain and 
principals who do not. There is :Limited information on 
principals' collective bargaining. This study is a further 
investigation into principals' perceptions of their working 
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conditions and the comparison of principals who are able to 
participate in the collective bargaining process to those who 
do not collectively bargain due to statutory limitations. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, a review of organizational theory 
introduced concepts and a historical overview of collective 
bargaining was presented. The specific studies pointed to the 
lack of certainty regarding the influence of collective 
bargaining on principals' perceptions of their working 
conditions. The studies also suggest a need for more 
information in this area. 
In Chapter III, the research methodology and procedures 
selected for the conduct of the research study will be 
introduced and reviewed. This chapter includes a review of 
the ( 1) research model, (2 ) 
procedures specific to the 
discussion of the research 
collection procedures, and 
selected for the study. 
research methodology, and (3 ) 
study. It also includes a 
instrument, population, data 
the data analysis techniques 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
AND PROCEDURE 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the research methodology and 
procedures selected to conduct the study. The presentation 
includes a review of the (1) research model, (2) research 
methodology, and (3) procedures specific to the study 
including a discussion of the (a) population and study sample, 
(b) data collection procedures (c) research instrument, and 
(d) the data analysis activities selected for the study. 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
The design for this study is quanti tati ve in nature. 
The research model was developed from the literature review 
presented in Chapter II. These scholarly contributions and 
research studies, which cite collective bargaining's impact 
upon the perceptions of principals regarding working 
conditions, were used to design a framework for this research. 
(See Figure 3). 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Perceptions of Principals Regarding Working Conditions In 
Washington Who Can Collectively Bargain and Principals In 
Oregon Who Can Not Collectively Bargain 
surveY·With 
QUestionnair~ 
February 1988 
WAS NGTON 
Oregon Washington 
Principals principals 
Can Not Collectively Can Collectively 
Bargain ~ Bargain ~ 
Random Sample Random Sample of 
f Perceptions Compare Perceptions 
of Principals principals J 
4 of Working --t. significant .41--- of Working 
Conditions Differences Conditions 
Categories Categories 
1. Salary 1. Salary 
2. Written Contracts 2. Written Contracts 
3. Autonomy 3. Autonomy 
4. Power and Authority 4. Power and Authority 
5. Job Security 5. Job Security 
6. Fringe Benefits G oup 6. Fringe Benefits 
7. Role Definitions "4t--- and --~ •• 7. Role Definitions 
8. Communication Individual 8. Communication 
9. Decision-making Categories 9. Decision making 
Figure 3. Diagram of research study design. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research method used in gathering and analyzing the 
data was descriptive in nature. Descriptive research 
"describes and interprets what is. It is concerned with 
conditions or relationships that exist; practices that 
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prevail; beliefs, points of view or attitudes that are held; 
processes that are going on; or trends that are developing" 
(Best, 1986, pg. 79). This investigation utilizes a specific 
subcategory of descriptive research known as the self-report 
survey. 
Survey research is a useful tool in education. It is 
ideally suited to and best adapted to the study of personal 
and social facts, beliefs, and attitudes (Kerlinger, 1973). 
Survey research has two basic advantages: 1) it has a wide 
scope and can deal with a great deal of information from a 
large population and 2) is accurate (Kerlinger, 1973). 
According to Babbie (1973), survey research is (1) logical and 
facilitates logical understanding; (2) deterministic, as it 
clarifies cause and affect, (3) general, because its purpose 
is to understand a large population and the generalizability 
of the findings to be tested and retested, (4) parsimonious, 
as a variety of explanatory models can be constructed and the 
best one selected for use, and (5) specific, based on 
definitions and measurements (Babbie, 1973). 
Best and Kahn (1986) note surveys as one of the most 
commonly used research methods in the study of individuals. 
This method gathers data from a relatively large number of 
cases at a particular time. The survey method is not 
concerned with characteristics of individuals, but rather is 
concerned with the generalized statistics which result when 
data are abstracted from a number of individual cases. The 
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use of questionnaires mailed to school administrators has 
proven successful in prior studies comparing bargaining and 
non-bargaining principals. Nasstrom and Pier (1983) compared 
bargaining and non-bargaining principals in Minnesota both in 
employment rights and personal satisfaction with employment. 
Their study includes questionnaires mailed to principals to 
determine their perceptions regarding the bargaining process. 
Caldwell and Paul (1982) used a survey of three-hundred (300) 
principals in Pennsylvania and their inclusion in formal or 
informal associations with school boards. Morris (1985) 
employed the survey technique to determine if elementary 
principals organized for purposes of collective bargaining 
possessed a greater number of working conditions and enjoyed 
greater job satisfaction when compared to elementary 
principals not organized for these same purposes. Williams 
(1985) surveyed two-hundred (200) principals in Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey to determine the relationship between the 
existence of collective bargaining for school principals and 
their perceptions of working conditions. 
The present study is similar to Nasstrom and Pier's and 
William's in its focus on comparing bargaining and non-
bargaining principals. However, the present study examines 
only the principals' perceptions of their working conditions 
in two states, one which legislatively permits school 
principals to collectively bargain and one which does not. 
The determinants of principals' working conditions were 
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identified and each of these were examined individually for 
significant differences betw~en the perceptions of bargaining 
and non-bargaining principals. This design is diagrammed in 
Figure 4. 
PRIMARY 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Analysis of- - - _ • 
Covariate 
if n~~essary 
Control Variables 
Type of District 
District Size 
Age 
Sex 
Years in Adminis-
tration 
Years in Teaching 
Level of Principal 
COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 
Non Bargaining 
Principals 
(Oregon) 
Bargaining 
Principals 
(Washington) 
Secondary 
~ndependent 
Variable 
Degree of 
Collective 
Bargaining 
1. Formal 
2. Meet and 
Confer 
3. Unilateral 
Decision 
Making 
"'-_____ --. DEPENDEN~ VARIABLE .~ ____ I
. ~ 
~, ., 
Salary Autonomy 
PERCEPTIONS OF 
WORKING CONDITION 
Job 
security 
~, 
Power 
and 
Role 
Definition 
~,Frin~e 
Benefl.ts 
~, 
Existence 
of 
Formal 
Contracts 
Authority 
,., 
Involvement 
in Decision 
Making 
~r 
Communication 
wl.th 
Board and 
Superintendent 
Figure 4. A schematic diagram of the research model. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 
As stated previously, Washington school principals may 
establish wages, hours and other conditions of employment 
through collective negotiations with their superintendents and 
school boards. Oregon laws do not sanction this arrangement. 
The primary major research question addressed in this 
study was: 
Does the existence of collective bargaining have an 
impact on public school principals' perceptions of their 
determinant areas of working conditions? 
HYPOTHESES 
Simply stated the null hypothesis assumes there is no 
significant difference in the perceptions of working 
conditions by bargaining principals as compared to non-
bargaining principals. 
This analysis includes nine sub-hypotheses: 
1. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining principals as compared to non-bargaining 
principals regarding salary. 
2. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non bargaining principals relative to 
the existence of formal written contracts. 
3. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative to 
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autonomy. 
4. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining principals as compared to non-bargaining 
principals relative to power and authority. 
5. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of job security between bargaining and non-bargaining 
principals relative to job security. 
6. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
between bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative 
to fringe benefits. 
7. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
between bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative 
to role definition. 
S. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
between bargaining and non-bargaining principals in the 
level of communication with school boards and 
superintendents • 
9. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
between bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative 
to their involvement in decision making. 
A second research question was additionally analyzed in 
this study: 
Does the level of collective bargaining have an effect 
on the perceptions of principals with regard to the nine 
areas of working conditions? 
This second research hypothesis investigated the level 
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of collective bargaining and the perceptions of the working 
conditions of public school principals. Nine additional sub-
hypotheses probed the secondary issue: 
1. There is no significant difference of the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of salary. 
2. There is no significant difference of the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of the existence of formal written contracts. 
3. There is no significant difference of the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of autonomy. 
4. There is no significant difference of the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of power and authority. 
5. There is no significant difference of the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of job security. 
6. There is no significant difference of the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of fringe benefits. 
7. There is no significant difference of the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of role definition. 
8. There is no significant difference of the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
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perception of the level of communication with school 
board and superintendent. 
9. There is no significant difference of the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of involvement in decision making. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
A third research question was developed to control for 
certain demographic variances in the sample population: 
Is there a significant difference between bargaining -
non bargaining principals in each of the demographic 
factors? 
This analysis included seven sub-hypotheses: 
1. There is no significant difference between bargaining 
and non-bargaining principals' perceptions relative to 
type of school district. 
2. There is no significant difference between bargaining 
and non-bargaining principals' perceptions relative to 
district size. 
3. There is no significant difference between bargaining 
and non-bargaining principals' perceptions relative to 
age. 
4. There is no significant difference between bargaining 
and non-bargaining principals' perceptions relative to 
their sex. 
5. There is no significance between bargaining and non-
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bargaining principals' perceptions relative to their 
years in administration. 
6. There is no significant difference between bargaining 
and non-bargaining principals' perceptions relative to 
their years in teaching. 
7. There is no significance between bargaining and non-
bargaining principals' perceptions relative to their 
level of principalship. 
These control variables were analyzed with regard only 
to the two states to compare the samples of the population for 
any significant differences. 
THE POPULATION AND STUDY SAMPLE 
The population for this study consists of all elementary 
and secondary public school principals in the states of Oregon 
and Washington who serve in the role of building principal and 
not superintendent. Principals who also serve as 
superintendent in their districts were excluded from the 
population. 
There are nine hundred eight (908) school principals in 
the State of Oregon who serve solely as principal and one 
thousand one hundred two (1102) in the State of Washington. 
In populations this large, there is no need to obtain 
information from all individuals. A variation of the random 
sample technique was selected for use in this study. This 
variation is called simple random sampling technique (Issac 
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and William, 1983). This variation allows drawing from a list 
of potential respondents on an ordered basis. 
Lists of all school principals in Oregon were obtained 
from the Oregon state Department of Education and from the 
Superintendents Office of Public Instruction in Washington. 
These lists provided a complete and up to date list of school 
principals in both states. 
Before the lists could be used for respondent selection, 
it was be necessary to identify any principal who also served 
as the superintendent of a school district, due to the size 
of the school district. These individuals were excluded due 
to a perceived lack of role definition in the area of labor 
management relations. This factor might influence responses 
from superintendent/principals if selected. The principals 
on the lists were then numbered sequentially by state. 
A group of one hundred (100) principals were selected 
from the Oregon list (eleven percent) as respondents using a 
table of random numbers and a group of one hundred (100) from 
the Washington list (nine percent) using a table of random 
numbers. 
The use of a stratafied random sampling technique insured 
the samples were representative of the total populations of 
principals in the two states. A sample size of ten percent 
(!10%) constitutes the actual group for this investigation. 
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SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
In order to insure the sample was representative of all 
school principals a random sample procedure was used. To 
produce an unbiased sample, a list of all principals was 
obtained from each state department of education and numbered 
consecutively, excluding names of those who also served as 
superintendents of the district. using a computerized random 
numbers chart for each list, the sample of one hundred 
principals from each state was selected. 
This sample size represents approximately ten percent of 
the total population available for study. According to Ary 
(1985), sample size depends upon the precision the researcher 
desires in estimating the population parameter at a particular 
confidence level (Ary et aI, 1985). There is no single rule 
used to determine sample size. This researcher determined 
two hundred (200) principals or ten percent of the total 
population was of sufficient size to be representative of the 
total study population. 
PROCEDURES 
In February, 1988 the questionnaire was mailed by u.S. 
Mail to each of the two hundred selected principals in Oregon 
and Washington. 
Each questionnaire contained a cover letter summarizing 
the research and outlining the effort necessary for its 
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completion (see Appendix A) and a letter of support from the 
Director of the Association of washington School Principals. 
Enclosed with the questionnaire was a postage paid return 
envelope and a Baskin and Robbins Ice Cream Gift certificate 
as a "reward" to each participating principal. The ice cream 
certificates were to increase the rate of return and reach the 
goal of an 80% return rate. Each cover letter and 
questionnaire included a code which allowed the researcher to 
moni tor which respondants returned the survey. The cover 
letter, letter of support and questionnaire appear in the 
appendix. The questionnaire was designed to take fifteen 
minutes to complete. Respondents were requested to return the 
questionnaire within two weeks after receipt. After a follow-
up letter was sent which had limited response, a seventy four 
(74) percent return rate was achieved for the study. The 
return rate for Oregon was sixty seven (67%) percent and 
eighty (80%) percent for Washington. The original letter and 
follow-up letter are contained in the Appendix A. 
INSTRUMENTATION 
The instrument selected for data gathering for the study 
is the School Principals' Working Conditions Questionnaire. 
This instrument, developed by the researcher, was developed 
from a combination of the Middle Management Working Conditions 
Questionnaire developed by Williams (1985), and The Principal 
Attitude Questionnaire ... Non-Union and The Principal Attitude 
54 
Questionnaire ... union by Morris (1985). The questionnaires 
from which the study instrument was developed have been used 
in similar studies measuring the perceptions of school 
administrators regarding working conditions for the purpose 
of answering questions on the process of collective 
bargaining.. Nine areas of concern to school principals as 
noted by Williams (1985) are identified as the determinants 
of principal's working conditions. The areas to be measured: 
salary, existence of formal written contracts, autonomy, power 
and authority, job security, fringe benefits, role 
definitions, communication and involvement in decision making 
are included. 
In Williams (1985) study of principals' perceptions 
regarding working conditions these determinants were used and 
for any possible comparison to prior study results it would 
be beneficial to use the same determinants. The two 
instruments from the prior studies were found to be valid and 
reliable measures of principal's perceptions in specific 
studies conducted by the researchers related to collective 
bargaining (Morris, 1985 and Williams, 1985). In addition to 
the information combined from the prior two investigations, 
eight questions were added to the proposed study's 
instrumentation to even the balance of questions in each 
determinant area. 
Thirty-two questions collected data specific to the 
dependent variables of the research design on working 
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conditions. Nine dependent variable subsets were identified: 
1) salary, 2) existence of formal wri tten contracts, 3 ) 
autonomy, 4) power and authority, 5) job security, 6) fringe 
benefits, 7) role definitions, 8) communication and 9) 
involvement in decision making to collect SUbcategory data 
relative to the perceptions of the respondent principals. 
Each of the thirty-two (32) items made a statement about the 
management of schools. Respondents were instructed to 
indicate the extent to which the stated condition actually 
exists in their school district based on a Likert-type scale. 
The scale ranged from a high of 5 - (To a very large extent) 
to a low of 1 - (Not at all). There were three to five items 
devoted to each of the nine areas designated as of primary 
concern to school principals (Williams, 1985). (See Figure 
5) • 
Anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed. special 
instructions were provided to those who desire to receive a 
copy of the results; a stamped, self addressed envelope was 
included for the instrument's return and a Baskin Robbins ice 
cream certificate as a "Thank You" for their completion and 
participation in the study. 
Due to the lack of specific measures listed in the 
research for previous instruments this instrument was checked 
for reliability through a test - retest model and a split -
half reliability check. 
The test-retest reliability tests consistency of a 
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subject score over time (Ary et aI, 1985). In the test -
retest procedure, the instrument was administered to twenty 
(20) principals, twice, with a two week time interval between 
each administration. The reliability for the instrument using 
Pearson's R correlation was .96 reliability in the test -
retest procedure. 
Determinant Area 
1- Salary 
2. Existence of Formal 
Contracts 
3. Autonomy 
4. Power and Authority 
5. Job Security 
6. Fringe Benefits 
7. Role Definition 
8. Communication 
9. Involvement in 
Decision Making 
* other research 
Question Numbers 
Reliability 
of Question 
Set 
(Test-Retest) 
*12, *13, *23 .92 
*16, *18,**22 .97 
*29, *30, **31 .95 
*19, *20, **21, .91 
**28 
*11, *17, **32 
*4, *14, *15, 
**27 
*10, *22, *24 
*1, *2, *3, **25, 
**26 
*5, *6, *7, *8, 
*9 
.100 
.97 
.89 
.96 
.99 
** researcher constructed 
Figure 5. Nine determinant area question distribution. 
The split - half technique is one of the most popular 
reliability checks (Ary, 1985). The split - half reliability 
for the instrument was .96 using Pearson's Rand .99 using the 
Spearman - Brown Prophecy formula to compensate for the fact 
that reliability was estimated from a test one-half the length 
of the final form. 
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Content validity cannot be expressed in numerical terms. 
It is the validation of the content based essentially, and out 
of necessity, on judgement. It invol ves the careful and 
critical examination of the test items as they relate to the 
specified content area (Ary, et al 1985). 
Validity of the instrument was checked in two ways. A 
ten member panel of principals who were not in the respondent 
group was selected to review and critique the instrumentation 
format and questionnaire content reliability. These 
principals were known to the researcher, and it was believed 
they would be objective and candid in review of the 
questionnaire instrument. All ten members reviewed the 
instrument, with one member indicating need for specific 
clarification. This clarification, in the demographic 
information, was regarding his district's classification as 
"urban, rural or suburban". As a result the classification 
of "small town" was added. 
The second check for validity was a review and critique 
by academic faculty at Portland state University. Those 
faculty members assisting with the final revision of the 
instrument were Dr. Joel Arick, an educational research 
specialist, Dr. Kathleen Westbrook, Assistant Professor of 
Education, Dr. John F. Heflin, Associate Professor of 
Education, Dr. Jack Lind, Professor of Education and Dr. Nancy 
Koroloff, Professor of Social Work. Additional assistance was 
provided by Tom Moreno, a statistician and research 
58 
methodologist. 
The research instrument was designed and developed 
between March 1987 and February 1988, under the direction of 
Dr. John F. Heflin, Chairperson of the investigator's 
Dissertation Committee and Dr. Joel Arick, a member of the 
investigator's Dissertation Committee. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
This study employs a descriptive design using survey 
techniques to describe two groups of principals and compare 
their perceptions of working conditions. The determinants of 
principals' working conditions as identified, are examined 
individually to discover the existance of any significant 
difference in the perceptions of working conditions for 
bargaining and non-bargaining principals. 
After all the data was collected and organized, it was 
analyzed using descriptive statistics to uncover differences 
between the two comparison groups. The nine determinants of 
principals' working conditions: salary, existence of formal 
written contracts, autonomy, power and authority, job 
security, fringe benefits, role definitions, communication and 
involvement in decision making were examined. 
Primary Independent Variable Data Analysis 
Responses to the questions were compared for the two 
principal groups. The analysis of the data is presented in 
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tabular format and compares principals' perceptions in the 
nine areas of primary concern to principals (see pages 50 and 
51). 
The items pertaining to each of the nine determinant 
areas of working conditions were grouped together, totaled and 
averages computed. For example, items 4# 12, 13, and 23, which 
pertain to salary, were grouped together. A one-way analysis 
of variance was used to compare the perceptions of bargaining 
and non-bargaining principals for each of the nine determinant 
areas to determine significant differences. These data were 
no longer treated as ordinal but were collapsed to simulate 
interval data and a one-way analysis of variance procedure 
applied for each of the respective groups. 
Secondary Independent Variable Analysis 
Respondents' answers were grouped into catagories 
representing levels of collective bargaining including 
formalized collective bargaining, informal, and unilateral 
decisions. A one-way analysis of variance was used to compare 
responses to these questions by principals and allow analysis 
of the secondary research questions noted on pages 52 and 53. 
Covariance 
Any demographic factors found to vary significantly 
between bargaining and non-bargaining principal groups (see 
demographic factor section), were used as covariates and an 
analysis of covariance procedure was conducted. Analysis of 
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covariance helps to explain· the effect of the primary 
independent variable (bargaining/non-bargaining) while 
controlling the effect of the identified demographic factors. 
Data were reported with respect to any variation in 
respondents in terms of demographic information. As an 
example, variation in either level of the principalship or 
size of school district were reported. These data were 
analyzed using a Chi ( ) technique to determine if 
significant differences between demographic variables and 
Oregon and Washington principals' perceptions were present. 
This analysis includes seven additional sub-hypotheses 
enumerated on pages 53 and 54 of this study. 
SUMMARY 
Chapter III presents the research methodology and 
procedures used in the conduct of this study. The information 
includes a review of the (1) research model, (2) research 
methodology, and (3) procedures specific to the study. A 
discussion of the population and study sample, data collection 
procedures, research instrumentation, and the data analysis 
techniques were enumerated. 
Chapter IV discusses the results of the data analysis 
activities. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Chapter IV is divided into five sections. The first 
section includes the primary analysis for the nine 
determinants of working conditions. The second section covers 
a secondary analysis of the data based on the level of 
collective bargaining and perceptions of working conditions 
as identified by the nine sub-hypothesis questions. section 
three reports the demographic analysis findings which includes 
seven sub-hypotheses. 
analysis of covariance 
chapter. 
section four presents data from the 
and section five summarizes the 
PRIMARY ANALYSIS 
Test of the Primary Hypothesis 
The primary hypothesis was constructed to determine if 
the existence of collective bargaining has an impact on public 
school principals' perceptions of their working conditions. 
The primary hypothesis was stated as follows: 
There is no significant difference in the perceptions of 
working conditions in bargaining principals as compared 
to non-bargaining principals. 
This hypothesis was tested through the application of a 
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one-way analysis of variance procedure on the calc'U.~.ated group 
means of the two sample groups on nine sub-hypotheses: 
1. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining principals as compared to non-bargaining 
principals regarding salary. 
2. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non-bargaining principals regarding the 
existence of formal written contracts. 
3. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non-bargaining principals regarding 
autonomy. 
4. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining principals as compared to non-bargaining 
principals regarding power and authority. 
5. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non bargaining principals regarding job 
security. 
6. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non-bargaining principals regarding 
fringe benefits. 
7. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non-bargaining principals regarding 
role definition. 
8. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non-bargaining principals in the level 
of communications with school board members and 
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superintendents. 
9. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non bargaining principals in their 
involvement in decision making. 
The data for these nine research sub-hypotheses are 
reported here (see Table I). 
The data reported in Table I shows only two of the nine 
primary sub-hypotheses, the areas of Formal Contracts and 
Autonomy, were found to be statistically significant. The 
remaining null hypotheses were not found to be statistically 
significant at p=<.05 level and failed to be rejected. 
The Existence of Formal written Contracts 
One of the primary concerns of principals, in determining 
perceptions of working conditions, is the existence of formal 
written administrative contracts (Barea, 1978). Principals 
in both Oregon and Washington were polled to determine the 
extent of written contracts. 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of responses of 
principals who may bargain (Washington) and those who may not 
(Oregon) . This figure shows Washington principals have a 
higher mean score than Oregon principals with regard to the 
existence of formal contracts. The shape of the distribution 
highlights bargaining principals perceive formal written 
contracts exist to a greater degree than do non-bargaining 
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TABLE I 
LEVELS OF SIGNIFICANCE AS DETERMINED BY A ONE-WAY ANALYSIS 
OF VARIANCE ON THE NINE SUB-HYPOTHESES QUESTIONS 
REGARDING BARGAINING AND NON-BARGAINING 
PRINCIPALS AND THEIR PERCEPTIONS 
OF WORKING CONDITIONS. 
Working F- Significance 
Conditions Ratio Level Means 
p < .05 DF WA/OR 
1. Salary 0.027 NS 1, 142 
2. Formal Contract 6.122 .015 1, 140 3.38/3.13 
3. Autonomy 7.934 .006 1, 140 2.90/3.24 
4. Power/Authority 0.368 NS 1, 130 
5. Job Security 0.170 NS 1, 128 
6. Fringe Benefits 0.181 NS 1, 142 
7. Role Definition 0.095 NS 1, 140 
8. Communication 0.162 NS 1, 133 
9. Decision Making 1.977 NS 1, 139 
NS = Not Significant 
WA = Washington (Bargaining) 
OR = Oregon (Non-bargaining) 
See Appendix C for additional analysis of variance 
statistics. 
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WASHINGTON 
(M=3.38) 
OREGON 
(M=3.13) 
1.00 2.00 3.00 ~.oo 
Figure 6. Histogram of principals perceptions 
regarding the existence of formal written contracts. 
principals, whose responses were clustered at the low end of 
the scale. 
A one-way analysis of variance of these responses was 
found to be statistically significantly different at .015 (See 
Table I). 
The null form for this sub-hypothesis stated there is no 
significant difference in the perceptions of bargaining and 
non bargaining principals regarding the existence of formal 
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written contracts. A test of statistical significance at the 
.05 level was performed and the null hypothesis was rejected 
(see Figure 6). 
Autonomy 
Another condition which was identified as having impact 
upon principals' perceptiond of working conditions was the 
degree of administrative autonomy. Independence and the 
discretion to manage a building were considered crucial if 
principals are to fulfill leadership roles. 
Principals from both bargaining and non-bargaining 
samples were questioned about the degree of autonomy they felt 
they possessed. Figure 7 presents the frequency distributions 
of the principals' responses. The figure shows Oregon 
principals (non-bargaining) report a higher mean score than 
Washington principals (bargaining) with regard to autonomy. 
The shape of the distribution shows non-bargaining principals 
perceive they have greater autonomy than do bargaining 
principals. Non-bargaining principals' responses were 
clustered at the higher end of the scale, while bargaining 
principals' responses spread along the continuum. 
An analysis of variance procedure determining differences 
between the two groups was found to be statistically 
significant. The differences were found to be statistically 
significant at the .05 level (see Table I). 
WASHINGTON 
(M=2.90) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
OREGON 
1.00 
(M=3.24) 
2.00 3.00 
Figure 7. Histogram of principals' perceptions 
regarding autonomy. 
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4.00 
The null form for this sub-hypothesis states there is no 
significant difference in the perceptions of autonomy of 
bargaining and non-bargaining principals. Based upon the 
selected .05 level of significance, the null hypothesis was 
rejected. It appears Oregon (non-bargaining) principals 
perceive the existence of autonomy more positively than do 
Washington (bargaining) principals. 
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SECONDARY ANALYSIS 
The secondary question was to analyze for effect of three 
perceived levels of collective bargaining relative to 
principals' perceptions of the nine areas of working 
conditions. The levels of bargaining to which principals 
responded were: 1) Formal collective bargaining, 2) Informal 
collective bargaining and 3) Unilateral decision making(see 
Table II). One hundred questionnaires were sent to principals 
in Oregon, and sixty-seven (67) were returned. Of these, 
eight (8) or twelve (12%) percent were from principals who did 
not meet at all with representatives of top management to 
determine their working conditions. The school board and 
superintendent made these decisions and informed principals 
who accept these unilateral decisions. 
TABLE II 
LEVELS OF BARGAINING INDICATED BY PRINCIPALS' RESPONSES. 
Formal Informal Unilateral Non 
Barg. Barg. Decision Response 
Num/Per Nwn/Per Num/Per Num/Per 
Oregon 17/27% 38/60% 8/12% 33/33% 
Washington 22/30% 39/53% 12/16% 20/20% 
Total 39/29% 77/59% 20/14% 
Num = Number 
Per = Percent 
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Thirty-eight (38) principals reported they held informal 
collective bargai.ning meetings with the superintendent and/or 
representatives of the school board. This number represents 
sixty (60%) percent of Oregon's respondents. 
Seventeen (17) Oregon principals or twenty-seven (27%) 
percent indicated that there was formal collective bargaining 
between representatives of middle management and the school 
board. 
Washington principals' responses were not substantively 
different from the Oregon sample relative to the degree of 
administrative collective bargaining (see Table II). This 
finding was unanticipated by the researcher. Inspection of 
the data indicated only three (3%) percent more Washington 
principals when compared to Oregon principals were involved 
in collective negotiations even though the statutory authority 
for bargaining exists in Washington State. 
Of the eighty (80) questionnaires returned, twenty-two 
(22), or thirty (30%) percent of the Washington respondents 
stated they were involved in formal collective bargaining with 
their school boards. Thirty-nine (39), or fifty-three (53%) 
percent were engaged in informal collective bargaining. There 
were twelve (12) principals or sixteen (16%) percent who 
reported they did not meet and accepted unilateral decisions 
by top management concerning working conditions. 
In combining data from both states, thirty-nine (39) or 
twenty-nine (29%) percent of the principals perceived they 
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are involved in formal collective bargaining, seventy-seven 
(77) or fifty-nine (59%) percent, in informal bargaining and 
twenty (20) or fourteen (14%) percent in unilateral decision 
processes (See Table II). 
Nine sub-hypotheses were tested using a one-way analysis 
of variance procedure to compare responses reported by the 
principals: 
1. There is no significant difference in 
levels of collective bargaining relative 
perception of salary. 
the three 
to the 
2. There is no significant difference in 
levels of collective bargaining relative 
the three 
to the 
perception of the existence of formal written contracts. 
3. There is no significant difference in the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of autonomy. 
4. There is no significant difference in 
levels of collective bargaining relative 
perception of power and authority. 
5. There is no significant difference in 
levels of collective bargaining relative 
perception of job security. 
6. There is no significant difference in 
levels of collective bargaining relative 
perception of fringe benefits. 
the three 
to the 
the three 
to the 
the three 
to the 
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7. There is no significant difference in the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of role definition. 
8. There is no significant difference in the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of the level of communication with the school 
board and superintendent. 
9. There is no significant difference in the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of involvement in decision making. 
Graphic data to test these nine sub-hypotheses are 
reported in Table III. 
Salary 
The first variable having an effect on principals' 
perceptions was salary. A comparison of the three levels of 
collective bargaining (formal collective bargaining, informal 
bargaining, and unilateral decision making) with salary was 
conducted using a one-way analysis of variance procedure. 
The significance level in the group means was at the .00 
level. Figure 8 portrays the frequency of responses for three 
groups of principals: 1) principals who formally bargain, 2) 
principals who informally bargain and 3) principals who accept 
unilateral decisions with regard to salary. The shape of the 
distribution indicates principals who formally bargain report 
a higher degree of satisfaction 
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TABLE III 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON THE NINE HYPOTHESES REGARDING 
LEVEL OF BARGAINING AND PRINCIPALS PERCEPTIONS 
OF WORKING CONDITIONS. 
Working F- p=<.05 Means: 
Conditions Ratio FB/IB/UD 
1. Salary 10.969 .00 3.10/3.01/2.23 
2. Formal 0.052 NS 
Contract 
3. Autonomy 2.301 NS 
4. Power/ 3.927 .022 2.55/2.76/2.29 
Authority 
5. Job Security 4.509 .013 3.05/3.19/2.65 
6. Fringe 4.238 .016 3.06/3.18/2.33 
Benefits 
7. Role 3.612 .03 3.33/3.26/2.81 
Definition 
8. Communicate 0.336 NS 
9. Decision 6.046 .00 2.90/3.22/2.77 
Making 
NS = Not Significant 
FB = Formal Bargaining 
IB = Informal Bargaining 
UD = Unilateral Decisions 
See Appendix C for additional analysis of variance 
statistics. 
DF 
2, 130 
2, 129 
2, 128 
2, 120 
2, 120 
2, 131 
2, 129 
2, 125 
2, 129 
FORMAL 
(K=3.10) 
INFORMAL 
(K=3.01) 
UNILATERAL 
(K=2.23) 
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
Figure 8. Histogram of principals' perceptions 
regarding salary and level of collective bargaining. 
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wi th their level of salary than do principals who meet 
informally or those who were recipients of unilateral 
decisions. These responses are grouped at the higher end of 
the scale while the remaining groups spread more evenly over 
the entire continuum. 
The null form of this sub-hypothesis states there is no 
significant difference between the three levels of bargaining 
relative to principals' perception of salary. A significance 
level of .05 level was selected. The null sub-hypothesis was 
rejected as the difference of the groups means was significant 
at the .00 level (see Table III). It appears principals who 
formally bargain have a higher degree of satisfaction with 
their salary level than reported by the other two sample 
groups. 
Power and Authority 
In comparing the levels of bargaining and principals' 
perceptions regarding power and authority, a one-way analysis 
of variance was performed. 
Figure 9 depicts the frequency distribution of responses 
between the variable of power and authority as reported by 
the three sample groups. The distribution indicates the 
informal bargaining group had a higher mean score than the 
other two sample groups. These responses were clustered at 
two points at a higher level as compared to the other two 
sample groups which clustered at one point or are more 
1. 00 
FORMAL l 
(M=2.55) 
INFORMAL 
(M=2.76) 
UNILATERAL 
(M=2.29) 
2.00 3.00 
Figure 9. Histogram of principals' perceptions 
regarding power and authority with collective 
bargaining level. 
4.00 
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dispersed across the continuum points. 
The null form of this sub-hypothesis states there is no 
significant difference in the level of collective bargaining 
relative to the perception of power and authori ty . When 
comparing the group means, a significant statistical 
difference at the .02 level was found and is reported in Table 
III. Based on a .05 rejection level, the null hypothesis was 
rejected and the research hypothesis retained. It appears 
principals who formally bargain perceive power and authority 
at higher levels than do the remaining two sample principal 
groups. 
Job Security 
Job security is another key factor related. to working 
conditions. Figure 10 shows the frequency distribution of 
responses. Principals reported regarding their perceptions 
of job security and level of bargaining. The distribution 
shows the informal group responses clustered at the high end 
of the scale thereby producing a higher mean score than the 
remaining two principal groups. Principal responses belonging 
to the formal bargaining and unilateral decision groups were 
dispersed more broadly across the continuum. 
An analysis of variance compared the means for these 
groups to assess significant differences. Tests of 
significance difference were calculated at the .01 level as 
noted in Table III. 
FORMAL 
(M=3.05) 
INFORMAL 
(H=3.19) 
UNILATERAL 
(M=2.65) 
1.00 2.00 3.00 
Figure 10. Histogram of principals' perceptions 
regarding job security with collective bargaining 
level. 
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The null form of this sub-hypothesis states there is no 
significant difference of the three levels of bargaining 
relative to principals' perceptions of job security. Based 
on a statistical test at the .05 level of rejection, the null 
hypothesis was rejected. The data indicate principals who 
informally meet perceive themselves to have a higher level of 
job security than do principals who bargain formally or are 
participants in unilateral decision making (See Table III). 
Fringe Benefits 
Fringe benefits are another important aspect of 
principals' working conditions. A comparison of the level of 
bargaining wi th principals' perceptions of their fringe 
benefits was calculated using a one-way analysis of variance. 
The means and distribution of responses for each 
bargaining level group are compared in Figure 11. The 
distribution of responses by principals in the three levels 
shows the informal group has a higher mean score than the 
other two principal groups. These responses were clustered 
at the high end of the continuum while the remaining two 
groups (formal and unilateral decision making responses) were 
more evenly distributed across the continuum. 
The difference, as noted in Table III, shows a 
statistically significant difference at the .016 level, using 
a one-way analysis of variance. 
FORM..AL 
(M=3.06) 
INFORMAL 
(M=3.18) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
UNILATERAL 
(M=2.33) 
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
Figure 11. Histogram of principals' perceptions 
regarding fringe benefits with collective bargaining 
level. 
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The null form for this sub-hypothesis states there is no 
significant difference amoung the three levels of bargaining 
in regards to principals I perceptions of fringe benefits. 
Based on a .05 level of rejection, the null hypothesis was 
rejected. There appeares to be a significant difference 
between those principals who informally bargain and those who 
formally bargain or participate in unilateral decision making. 
Principals who informally bargain perceive that they have a 
higher level of fringe benefits. 
Role Definition 
Role definition is defined by the elements within a job 
description and the related staff development programs 
designed specifically for administrators. 
Figure 12 shows the frequency of responses of all 
respondent principals with regard to role definition. The 
distribution of responses cluster at the high end of the 
continuum for the formal bargaining group, reporting a higher 
mean score than the other two sample groups. The informal 
group, although also clustered near the high end of the scale, 
had lower overall responses and a more evenly distributed 
response set across the lower end of the continuum than was 
the case for the formal group. The responses for the 
unilateral group were spread evenly across the continuum. 
The null form for this sub-hypothesis stated that there 
is no significant difference between the level of collective 
FORMAL 
INFORHAL 
(M=3.26) 
UNILATERAL 
(M=2.81) 
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
Figure 12. Histogram of principals' perceptions 
regarding role definition with collective bargaining 
level. 
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bargaining and perceptions of role definition. A statistical 
test at the .05 level of significance led to a rejection of 
the null hypothesis. The difference in the means of the 
groups was significant at the .03 level (See Table III). 
There is a significant difference in the perceptions of role 
definition for principals who formally bargain when compared 
to those who informally meet or those who accept unilateral 
decisions. 
Involvement In Decision Making 
The degree of involvement in decision making was the last 
factor to be compared. A comparison of the level of 
bargaining with principals I perceptions of their participation 
in decision making was conducted using an analysis of variance 
technique. 
Figure 
respondent 
13 shows the frequency 
principals who formally 
distribution of the 
bargain and their 
perceptions of involvement in decision making as well as the 
responses of those principals who informally bargain and those 
who accept unilateral decisions. The distribution responses 
in the three bargaining levels shows the informal group IS 
responses cluster toward the high end of the continuum. The 
mean score for this group was higher than for the remaining 
two groups whose responses were distributed more evenly across 
the continuum. 
1.00 
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FORMAL 
(M=2.90) 
INFORKAL 
(M=3.22) 
UNILATERAL 
(M=2.77) 
2.00 3.00 4.00 
Figure 13. Histogram of principals' perceptions 
regarding decision making with collective bargaining 
level. 
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The null form for this sub-hypothesis states there is no 
significant difference in the level of bargaining in regards 
to the perception of involvement in decision making. A 
statistical test at the .05 level led to the rejection of the 
null hypothesis (the difference was significant at the .00 
level (see Table III)}. For those principals engaging in an 
informal level of collective bargaining, there was a 
significantly higher mean score than for the other groups. 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA ANALYSIS 
The third section of the data analysis activities was 
constructed to analyze demographic data and its possible 
effect on principals' perceptions of '~orking conditions. The 
demographic variable included were: 1) district 
classification, 2) district size, 3} age, 4} gender,S) years 
in aruninistration, 6) years in teaching, and 7) current level 
of position. These data are reported in Table IV. 
One of the hypotheses tested in this study was to 
determine if a significant difference exists between the two 
groups of principals, bargaining and non-bargaining, with each 
of the identified demographic variables. 
This analysis included seven sub-hypotheses: 
1. There is no significance between bargaining and non-
bargaining principals and the type of school district. 
2. There is no significance between bargaining and non-
bargaining principals and their district size. 
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TABLE IV 
DESCRIPTION OF DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR THE STUDY. 
WA OR Study 
Dist. Classification 
% Rural 21.25 32.84 26.53 
% Small Town 22.50 37.31 29.25 
% Suburban 40.00 13.43 27.89 
% Urban 16.25 16.42 16.33 
Dist. Size 
% Large 45.47 23.88 23.88 
% Medium 36.71 47.76 47.76 
% Small 17.72 28.36 28.36 
Age 
Range 33-61 31-66 31-66 
Mean 46 45 45.6 
Gender 
% Male 81.25 77.61 79.59 
% Female 18.75 22.39 20.14 
Yrs. In Administration 
Range 1-31 2-41 1-41 
Mean 12.2 10 12 
Yrs. In Teaching 
Range 3-21 1-27 1-27 
Mean 9.3 10.4 9.7 
Current Level Of 
Position 
% Secondary 31.25 17.91 25.17 
% Middle 23.75 19.40 21. 77 
% Elementary 45.00 62.69 53.06 
% = Percent 
3. There is no significance between bargaining and 
non-bargaining principals and their age. 
4. There is no significance between bargaining and 
non-bargaining principals and their gender. 
5. There is no significance between bargaining and 
non-bargaining principals and their years in 
administration. 
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6. There is no significance between bargaining and 
non-bargaining principals and their years in teaching. 
7. There is no significance between bargaining and non-
bargaining principals and their level of principalship. 
The results of the data analysis activities using a Chi 
Square (~~) analysis are reported in Table V. Seven major 
demogra"phic variables were analyzed looking for major 
differences between bargaining (Washington) and non-bargaining 
(Oregon) principal groups. Two were found to be statistically 
significant with this analysis: district classification and 
district size. The other five demographic variables may be 
related within groups with regard to working conditions but 
for the analysis, the demographic variables were only 
considered for group the bargaining and non-bargaining bias. 
District Classification 
Principals responded to the district classification 
section of the study by classifying their district. The types 
of district classifications were: 1) urban, 2) suburban, 3) 
TABLE V 
LEVELS OF SIGNIFICANCE AS DETERMINED BY A CHI-SQUARE 
ANALYSIS OF BARGAINING AND NON-BARGAINING 
PRINCIPAL AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTOR. 
Demographic 
Factor 
1- District 
2. District 
3. Age 
4. Gender 
5. Years in 
6. Years in 
7. Level of 
Class. 
Size 
Admin. 
Teaching 
Position 
NS = Not -S-ig·nificant 
x2 
Value 
13.808 
7.663 
.297 
4.122 
Level of 
significance 
p=<.05 
.003 
.022 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
OF 
2, 144 
2, 144 
1, 145 
2, 144 
See Appendix C for additional analysis statistics. 
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small town or 4) rural (See Table VI). The significance of 
this variable appears attributable to a key finding that the 
number of principals responding from suburban districts was 
considerably higher from Washington than from Oregon. 
District classification was compared with working 
condition determinants found to be significant in the primary 
and secondary data analyses. 
An analysis of variance was conducted to determine what 
effect district classification had on bargaining and non-
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TABLE VI 
CHI SQUARE TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE COMPARING BARGAINING 
AND NON-BARGAINING PRINCIPALS WITH THE DEMOGRAPHIC 
VARIABLE OF DISTRICT CLASSIFICATION. 
rural small town suburl;>an urban TOTAL 
Oregon 14.97 17.01 6.12 7.48 45.58 
Washington 11.56 12.24 21. 77 8.84 54.42 
TOTAL 26.53 29.25 27.89 16.33 100.00 
Test Statistic Value DF Prob 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.808 2 .003 
bargaining principals in the two significant areas of working 
conditions: Autonomy and Formal Contracts (see Table I). The 
analysis revealed a significant effect for this control 
variable on the dependent variable with regard to autonomy at 
the .03 level. The analysis of variance also identified a 
significant effect for this control variable on the dependent 
variable of formal contracts at the. 01 level (see Table VII) • 
The data suggests the factor of suburban district (which is 
not as closely matched as the other classifications between 
the two states) has a significant effect on determinants of 
autonomy and formal contracts. There were more respondents 
from suburban districts in Washington than from Oregon. 
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TABLE VII 
LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE AS DETERMINED BY A ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF 
VARIANCE OF DISTRICT CLASSIFICATION AND WORKING 
CONDITIONS FOUND SIGNIFICANT. 
Primary Analysis F significant 
Working Condition Ratio Level OF 
p=<.05 
Autonomy 3.152 .027 3, 138 
Formal Contracts 3.483 .011 3, 138 
Secondary Analysis 
Working Condition 
Salary 8.246 .000 3, 140 
Power/Authority NS 
Job Security NS 
Fringe Benefits NS 
Role Definition 10.778 .00 3, 138 
Decision Making 3.136 .028 3, 137 
NS = Not significant 
See Appendix C for additional analysis of variance 
statistics. 
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An analysis of variance was also conducted to determine 
the effect of district classification on the levels of 
bargaining for each of the six working conditions found 
significant with regard to level of bargaining: 1) salary, 
2) role definitions, 3) power and authority, 4) involvement 
in decision making, and 5) fringe benefits. 
As noted in Table VII, the analysis of variance revealed 
a significant effect by this control variable in the area of 
salary at the .00 level, the area of role definition at the 
.00 level and the area of decision making at the .03 level 
based on a significant level of .05. It appears there is a 
significant effect on those three working conditions based 
upon district classification. 
District Size 
The questionnaire asked respondents to categorize the 
size of the districts they represented. 
divided into three categories: 
1) Small 
2) Medium 
3) Large 
o - 999 students 
1000 - 4999 students 
5000 - larger students 
Districts were 
This demographic variable was found to be significant at 
the .05 level (See Table VIII). The significance is 
attributed to the numbers of principals responding in the 
large district category. There were considerably more 
respondents from large districts in Washington than from 
Oregon. 
TABLE VIII 
CHI SQUARE TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE COMPARING BARGAINING AND 
NON-BARGAINING PRINCIPALS WITH DISTRICT SIZE. 
PERCENTS OF TOTAL 
LARGE MEDIUM SMALL TOTAL 
OREGON 10.96 21.92 13.01 45.89 
WASHINGTON 24.66 19.86 9.59 54.11 
TOTAL 35.62 41. 78 22.60 100.00 
TEST STATISTIC VALUE DF PROB 
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE 7.663 2 .022 
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Analysis of variance was conducted to determine the 
effect of demographic variable of district size on the 
independent variable of bargaining and non-bargaining 
principals. The only dependent variable of working conditions 
found to be significant was formal contracts. The analysis 
of variance found the effect to be significant at the .03 
level, based on a significance level of .05 (See Table IX). 
The number of principals responding from large districts in 
washington, when compared with the number of principals in 
Oregon, has a significant effect on the area of formal 
contracts. 
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TABLE IX 
LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE AS DETERMINED BY A ONE-WAY ANALYSIS 
OF VARIANCE OF DISTRICT SIZE AND WORKING CONDITIONS 
FOUND SIGNIFICANT. 
Primary Analysis 
Working Condition 
Autonomy 
Formal Contracts 
Secondary Analysis 
Work Condition 
Salary 
Power/Authority 
Job Security 
Fringe Benefits 
Role Definition 
Decision Making 
NS = Not Significant 
F-
Ratio 
3.786 
10.642 
2.959 
12.504 
Level of 
DF Significance 
p=<.05 
NS 
2, 138 .025 
2, 140 .00 
2, 129 .055 
NS 
NS 
2, 138 .00 
NS 
See Appendix C for additional analysis of variance 
statistics. 
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An analysis of variance was also conducted to examine 
the effect of district size on the levels of bargaining and 
working conditions which were statistically significant in 
the Secondary Analysis Section. These were salary, role 
definition, power and authority, and involvement in decision 
making. 
As noted in Table IX, this analysis showed district size 
to have a significant effect upon salary (.OO), role 
definition (.OO), and power and authority (.05 level). 
Analysis of Covariance 
Since district classification and size of district 
significantly vary between ~argaining and non-bargaining 
principal groups (see Demographic Data Analysis section), 
these variables were used as covariates in an ANCOVA analysis 
of the six significant determinants of working conditions. 
Three of the six analyses were found to be statistically 
significant (see Table X). 
The analysis of covariance determined the effect of 
district classification and district size upon the independent 
variable of bargaining and non-bargaining principals and its 
impact on the dependent variable of autonomy. After adjusting 
for the two covariates, the significant difference was at the 
.01 level. A statistical test at the .05 level of rejection 
was conducted. The primary analysis sub-hypothesis that there 
is no significant difference in bargaining and non-bargaining 
TABLE X 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE OF DISTRICT SIZE AND DISTRICT 
CLASSIFICATION ~ND THE SIX SIGNIFICANT 
DETERMINANTS OF WORKING CONDITIONS. 
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Analysis working 
Condition 
DF F -
Ratio 
Mean signif. 
p=<.05 
Primary -
Bargaining/ 
Non Bargain. 
Primary 
Primary 
Secondary -
Level of 
Bargaining 
Secondary 
Secondary 
Secondary 
Secondary 
Auto. 1, 137 
Formal Cont. 
Salary 2, 127 
Power/Author. 
Role Def. 
Decision 
Making 
2, 128 
FB = Formal Bargaining 
IB = Informal Bargaining 
UD = unilateral Decision Making 
6.478 
3.332 
7.848 
2.922 
1.177 
6.156 
WA/OR 
2.90/ 
3.24 
3.38/ 
3.13 
FB/ 
IB/ 
UD 
3.10/ 
3.01/ 
2.23 
2.55/ 
2.76/ 
2.29 
3.33/ 
3.26/ 
2.81 
2.90/ 
3.22/ 
2.77 
See Appendix C for additional analysis statistics. 
.01 
NS 
.001. 
NS 
NS 
.03 
principals with regard to autonomy was rejected. 
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There 
appears to be a significant difference between bargaining and 
non-bargaining principals with reference to their perception 
of autonomy (see Figure 7). 
For a secondary level of analysis (the level of 
bargaining), two determinants were significant. The first 
measured the effect of district classification and district 
size on the independent variable level of bargaining and its 
impact on the dependent variable of salary. Adjusting for 
the two covariates, a .00 level of significance was calculated 
(See Table X). The sub-hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference in the level of bargaining with regard 
to salary was rejected based upon a test at the .05 level of 
significance. 
The second analysis of covariance measured the effect of 
the covariates upon the level of bargaining relative to 
involvement in decision making. After adjusting for the two 
covariates, the level of significance was adjusted to .00 (See 
Table X). The secondary sub-hypothesis was rejected based on 
a .05 rejection level. The hypothesis states there is no 
significant difference in the level of bargaining with regard 
to involvement in decision making. 
Even after adjusting for other significant factors, both 
salary and involvement in decision making appear significant. 
An analysis of covariance was not used to analyze the 
data regarding fringe benefits and job security as they had 
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already been determined to be significant through the analysis 
of variance. The demographic data was not found to have any 
significant effect on their significance and therefore, an 
analysis of covariance was not necessary. The data analysis 
identified differences in the perceptions of principals who 
participate in formal bargainin9, principals invol ved in 
informal bargaining and those who accept unilateral decisions. 
Principals involved in formal bargaining report significantly 
higher mean responses in the area of salary than those who 
informally bargain or who are recipients of unilateral 
decisions (see Figure 8). Principals who informally bargain 
report significantly higher mean scores relative to 
involvement in decision making, fringe benefits and job 
security than those who participate in formal bargaining or 
unilateral decision making models. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an analysis of the data for this 
investigation. The activities included 1) analysis of the 
nine areas of working conditions, 2) analysis of the level of 
bargaining and perceptions of working conditions, 3) 
demographic analysis with seven sub hypotheses, and 4) an 
analysis of covariance (see Table XI). 
The primary analysis compared bargaining and non-
bargaining principals using nine determinant areas of working 
conditions in which two areas were found to be significant: 
r---
TABLE XI 
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT DETERMINANTS OF WORKING 
CONDITIONS IN EACH ANALYSIS. 
Working F-
Analysis Condition Ratio Significance 
p=<_05 
Primary Analysis Formal Contracts 6.122 0.015 
Bargain/Non-bargain Autonomy 7.934 0.006 
ANOVA 
Secondary Analysis Salary 10.969 0.000 
Level of Bargaining Power/Authority 3.927 0.022 
ANOVA 
Job Security 4.509 0.013 
Fringe Benefits 4.238 0.016 
Role Definition 3.612 0.030 
Decision Making 6.046 0.003 
Demographic Analysis Autonomy 3.152 0.027 
of District Size andl 
or Classification Formal Contracts 3.483/ 0.025/ 
ANOVA 3.786 0.011 
Salary 8.246 0.000 
Role Definition 10.778 0.000 
Power/Authority 2.959 0.055 
Decision Making 3.136 _028 
Primary Analysis Autonomy 6.478 0.012 
ANCOVA 
Secondary Analysis Salary 7.848 0.001 
ANCOVA 
Decision Making 6.156 0.030 
ANCOVA NOT NEEDED Fringe Benefits 4.238 0.016 
Job Security 4.509 0.013 
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1) formal contracts and 2) autonomy. The secondary analysis 
compared level of bargaining with the same determinant areas. 
Six areas were statistically significant: 1) salary, 2) power 
and authority, 3) job security, 4) fringe benefits, 5) role 
definition and 6) decision making. 
The two demographic factors found to be statistically 
significant were: District classification and District size. 
After conducting an analysis of variance using these two 
demographic variables, the significant determinant working 
condition areas effected by the demographic variables in both 
the primary and secondary analysis were: 1) autonomy, 2) 
formal contracts, 3) salary, 4) role definition, 5) decision 
making, and 6) power/authority. 
The analysis of covariance revealed, even after adjusting 
for the two covariates of district classification and district 
size, three working condition areas as still statistically 
significant. In the primary data analysis, there remained a 
statistically significant difference between bargaining and 
non-bargaining principals relative to autonomy. The null 
hypothesis was therefore rejected. This hypothesis states 
there is no significant difference between the two principal 
groups in the area of autonomy. 
In the secondary data analysis, there remained a 
statistically significant difference between the level of 
bargaining with regard to the determinants of salary, 
involvement in decision making, job securi ty , and fringe 
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benefits. In the secondary analysis, four sub-hypotheses were 
also rejected. These are: 
1) There is no significant difference in the three levels 
of collective bargaining relative to the perception of 
salary. 
2) There is no significant difference in the other levels 
of collective bargaining relative to the perception of 
involvement in decision making. 
3) There is no significant difference in the three levels 
of collective bargaining relative to the perception of 
job security. 
4) There is no significant difference in the three levels 
of collective bargaining relative to the perception of 
fringe benefits. 
Chapter V reports the study's findings, conclusions and 
recommendations based on the analysis provided in Chapter IV 
are discussed. 
CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter begins with a review of the problem 
statement, research design, and data analysis. It is followed 
by a discussion of the study's findings and their implications 
for policy and practice. The chapter concludes with 
suggestions for future research into collective bargaining for 
educational administrators. 
STUDY SUMMARY 
Review of the Problem 
The legitimacy of administrative collective bargaining 
in public education has gained greater acceptance in recent 
years. Although collective bargaining for school principals 
flourished during the sixties and seventies, during the last 
fifteen years there have been very few changes or significant 
developments in collective bargaining for administrators. 
Correspondingly, the publics' attitude toward educational 
administration has been mixed as indicated in the review of 
literature in Chapter II. 
Organizational theory and the history of the American 
Labor Movement have greatly influenced the right of school 
principals to organize for the purpose of collective 
bargaining. Various theories support the need for principals 
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to achieve higher order need satisfactions. Maslow's (1954) 
theory is based on the idea that motivation is an eternal 
force which cannot be imposed by external effort. 
Herzberg (1966) found that contented workers 
Frederick 
derived 
satisfaction directly from job satisfiers and motivators. 
Blau (1978) speaks to the "exchange theory" as the give and 
take of services in exchange for wages and benefits. The 
assumption is that men seek to adjust social conditions to 
achieve their ends is realistic and inescapable. Specific 
forms of social organization, such as unions are the result 
of the exchange process. The patterns of conduct by 
individuals or groups and their relations readjust through the 
process of exchange and competition (Blau, 1978). 
When school boards establish with principals the means 
for openly discussing and acting on relevant concerns such as 
wages, role definition, autonomy, and authority it may enhance 
in principals, a greater sense of professional recognition and 
esteem (Caldwell and Paul, 1983). 
Principals in many school districts do not have the same 
access to negotiated decision making as do their subordinates 
(teachers) who are involved in collective bargaining (Caldwell 
and Paul, 1983). This decision making process with respect 
to wages, benefits and self-interest is an acceptable practice 
to upper management in public and private sector 
organizations. In education, upper management (school boards 
and superintendents) tend to hold more tightly to unilateral 
one-sided decision making due to the negative public attitudes 
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which have emerged as a result of teacher collective 
bargaining. 
Principals have used collective bargaining as a means of 
accessing the decision making process to get greater input 
with respect to wages, benefits, and overall working 
conditions. Many principals have felt pushed into collective 
bargaining because decisions made by school boards have 
adversely effected principals' jobs. 
Teachers' roles in collective bargaining have also pushed 
administrators toward a collective bargaining model, and 
administrators see negotiations going on around them but 
seldom with them. Bargaining between top management and 
teachers, in which principals do not participate, has 
undermined their prerogatives when viewing the gains made by 
teachers in salary and other welfare issues. It is not 
surprising that the process had appeal to principals. 
The principal's role in school site management is putting 
policy into practice. Administering the teacher contract is 
a major part of this policy management for principals, but 
they have less authority than the teachers in developing the 
bargaining process and the contract. 
Principals are "caught in the middle" of collective 
bargaining dynamics. Al though they are expected to administer 
narrowly defined practices as prescribed by the teacher 
contract, many do not have direct access to formalized 
channels of input to their governing boards in defining 
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principals' working conditions, that the collective bargaining 
process would bring. However, participation in the collective 
bargaining process means participating in an adversarial 
model. 
Proponents of the "administrative team" concept feel it 
is the major victim of principals' right to collectively 
bargain. The adversarial aspects of bargaining make the 
"administrative team" concept impossible to implement. 
Collective bargaining for administrators in Oregon and 
Washington differs based on the legal statutes within each 
state. In Oregon the legislature did not develop a statute 
to encourage collective bargaining. It was left to the local 
control of each district to determine the process. In 
Washington, a statute was developed and implemented with rules 
and regulations guiding the collective bargaining process for 
principals. 
This study examined the perceptions of public school 
principals in Oregon and Washington regarding working 
conditions and analyzed the relationships between principals' 
perceptions and their ability to collectively bargain. 
From a review of the social/behavioral science 
literature, two research questions were developed to guide the 
study. 
1) Do school principals who can legally bargain 
collectively for their working conditions perceive these 
conditions differently than principals who can not? 
2) What 
collective 
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is the relationship between the level of 
bargaining and public school principals' 
perceptions of working conditions? 
The research question which guided the study and from which 
the primary hypothesis was developed was question number one. 
From the first research question, the following primary 
research hypothesis was developed: 
There is no significant difference in the perceptions of 
bargaining principals and non-bargaining principals 
regarding working conditions. 
The following sub-hypotheses were developed to guide this 
part of the study. The primary analysis tested the following 
sub-hypotheses: 
1. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining principals and non-bargaining principals 
regarding salary. 
2. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non bargaining principals relative to 
the existence of formal written contracts. 
3. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative to 
autonomy. 
4. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining principals as compared to non-bargaining 
principals relative to power and authority. 
5. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
105 
bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative to job 
security. 
6. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative to 
fringe benefits. 
7. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative to 
role definition. 
8. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non-bargaining principals in the level 
of communication with school boards and superintendents. 
9. There is no significant difference in the perceptions 
of bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative to 
their involvement in decision making. 
The second research question which guided the study was: 
What is the relationship between the level of collective 
bargaining and public school principals' perceptions of 
working conditions? 
From the second question, the following secondary hypothesis 
was developed: 
There is no significant difference between the level of 
bargaining of principals and their perceptions of working 
conditions. 
The following sub-hypotheses were developed from the 
secondary hypothesis! 
1. There is no significant difference in the three 
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levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of salary. 
2. There is no significant difference in the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of the existence of formal written contracts. 
3. There is no significant difference in the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of autonomy. 
4. There is no significant difference in 
levels of collective bargaining relative 
the three 
to the 
perception of power and authority. 
5. There is no significant difference in the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of job security. 
6. There is no significant difference in 
levels of collective bargaining relative 
perception of fringe benefits. 
7. There is no significant difference in 
levels of collective bargaining relative 
perception of role definition. 
the three 
to the 
the three 
to the 
S. There is no significant difference in the three 
levels of collective bargaining relative to the 
perception of the level of communication with the school 
board and superintendent. 
9. There is no significant difference in 
levels of collective bargaining relative 
the three 
to the 
107 
perception of involvement in decision making. 
Research Design 
The population for this study consisted of all 
elementary, middle level, and secondary public school 
principals in Oregon and Washington. 
To insure the sample would be representative of all 
school principals, a simple random sample procedure was 
utilized. A list of all principals was obtained from the 
Oregon and Washington state Departments of Education. The 
names on each list were consecutively numbered, excluding 
those principals who also served as superintendent in their 
respective districts. Using a computerized random numbers 
chart for each list, a sample of one hundred principals from 
each state was drawn. 
The sample represented approximately ten percent of the 
total population available for study. Eighty (80) Washington 
principals and sixty-seven (67) Oregon principals responded 
to the questionnaire for an overall return rate of seventy 
three and one half (73.5%) percent. This sampling technique 
enabled the investigator to learn more about the perceptions 
of school principals in both Washington and Oregon. 
Washington and Oregon were chosen in order to obtain 
responses from principals in one state, who by state statute, 
may collectively bargain and to compare their responses to 
those of principals working in a state which does not have 
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statutory authority for administrative collective bargaining. 
Data were collected through use of the School Principal 
Working Conditions Questionnaire. This instrument was 
developed by the researcher, adapted from a combination of the 
Middle Management Working Conditions Questionnaire developed 
by williams (1985), and The Principal Attitude 
Questionnaire •.• Non-Union and The Principal Attitude 
Questionnaire •.. Union by Morris (1985). All data were 
analyzed utilizing the SYSTAT (The System for Statistics) 
microcomputer statistical package. 
In analyzing the data, items pertaining to each of the 
nine determinant areas of working conditions were grouped, 
totaled and averaged. A one-way analysis of variance was used 
to compare the perceptions of bargaining and non-bargaining 
principals in each of the nine determinant areas of working 
conditions. These data were not treated as ordinal, but were 
collapsed to simUlate interval data and a one-way analysis of 
variance technique was utilized to analyze the data set. 
Respondents' answers were grouped into categories 
representing three levels of collective bargaining: 1) 
formal collective bargaining, 2) informal, and 3) unilateral 
decisions. A one-way analysis of variance was used to compare 
principals' responses. 
When a demographic factor was found to significantly vary 
between bargaining and non-bargaining principal groups, this 
variable was used as a covariate and an analysis of covariance 
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was conducted. Analysis of covariance helped to explain the 
effects of the primary independent variable (bargaining/non 
bargaining) without the effect of the demographic factor. 
FINDINGS 
Results of the data analysis are reported in the order 
the questions are stated: 
1) Do school principals who can legally bargain 
collectively for their working conditions perceive these 
conditions differently than principals who can not? 
2) What is the relationship between the level of 
collective bargaining and public school principals' 
perceptions of working conditions? 
Question one guided the development of the primary 
hypothesis addressed in the study: There is no significant 
difference in the perceptions of bargaining principals versus 
non-bargaining principals concerning working conditions. 
To test this hypothesis, mean scores of the satisfaction 
ratings of Washington principals were compared to the mean 
scores of the ratings for Oregon principals in each of nine 
determinant areas of working conditions. The data indicates 
that Washington principals (legally authorized to bargain) 
recorded higher mean scores than did Oregon principals (non-
bargaining) in only one area which was statistically 
significant, the Existence of Formal Contracts. Oregon 
principals recorded a significantly higher mean score than 
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washington principals in the area of Autonomy. According to 
the analysis of variance results, the .05 level of 
significance was achieved in both of these areas (See Table 
XI). The results of the analysis of covariance, indicate only 
the area of Autonomy was significant at the .05 level (see 
Table XI). There were no significant differences between the 
two groups in the areas of 1) salary, 2) power and authority, 
3) job security, 4) fringe benefits,S) role definition, 6) 
communication, and 7) decision making. 
There still remained a statistically significant 
difference relative to the variable of autonomy for the two 
groups of principals. Non-bargaining principals (Oregon) 
perceive the autonomy they possess in managing their buildings 
to be higher than do bargaining principals (Washington). The 
explanation for this finding may be attributable to the notion 
that collectively they have no impact upon district collective 
bargaining processes but as school site managers, they are 
able to make a difference in the education of children and 
they do have impact on teacher behavior. Another view may be 
that decisions made at the district level have little or no 
impact at the building level and the principal has more 
independence in all aspects of school management, including 
working with the superintendent, regarding conditions of work. 
Principals are more involved in all decisions which impact 
them directly. These decisions may not directly impact 
working conditions, but the principals involvement in the 
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process affects their perceptions of autonomy. There may not 
be a division between the decision process regarding school 
management and principals' business as in Washington, where 
the decision making process regarding working conditions may 
be different than other decision making processes. 
The second research question, with regard to the level 
of bargaining and its impact on principals' perceptions of 
working conditions, guided the secondary hypothesis: There 
is no significant difference between the level of bargaining 
of principals and their perceptions of working conditions. 
A secondary analysis was conducted to determine levels of 
bargaining which significantly impacted the perceptions of 
principals working conditions. Mean scores of principals' 
responses to levels of bargaining were compared with the nine 
determinant areas of working conditions. Analyses of variance 
and covariance indicated only four determinants were 
statistically significant. For the formal collective 
bargaining group, the area of salary (.001) was significant. 
Decision making (.030 level), job security (.013), and fringe 
benefits (.016) were significant for the informal bargaining 
group (see Table XI, Chapter IV). 
There were no significant differences between the two 
principal groups in the level of bargaining and the areas of 
1) autonomy, 2) formal contracts, 3) power and authority, 4) 
role definition, and 5) communication. 
The relationship between formal bargaining and salary 
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perceptions appears to be tightly coupled. For example, 
principals who indicated they formally bargained had a 
significantly higher mean score than did principals who 
indicated an informal level of bargaining or those who 
belonged to the unilateral decision making group. This 
perception suggests that one factor which may contribute to 
higher levels of satisfaction with the adequacy of salary for 
principals is the formal collective bargaining process. 
Anderson (1970) notes substantial gains in salary and other 
welfare issues have been made by teachers through the formal 
collective bargaining process. This is similar to the results 
indicated in the research by LeCesne (1980), where a positive 
correlation between formalized bargaining and the degree of 
satisfaction with adequacy of principals' salaries. 
In the areas of involvement in decision making, job 
security, and fringe benefits, the group of principals 
claiming to have informal levels of bargaining had 
significantly higher mean scores than principals who indicated 
a formal level of bargaining or those engaged in unilateral 
decision making processes. An explanation for this finding 
is they are involved in the decision making process more often 
or to a greater extent than those principals in the formal 
and unilateral levels of bargaining. This may be 
characteristic of informal bargaining processes which 
incorporate the "administrative team" concept. 
As in the area of involvement in decision making, 
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principals' participation in informal bargaining may bring 
about greater interaction between the principals and 
superintendent or school board in establishing specific 
policies and procedures that principals perceive to impact 
their job security. This interaction can offer increased 
opportunities for professional growth for all members of the 
team. Increased collaboration can lead to an increase in the 
professionalism of the team and bring about greater fringe 
benefi ts. Principals in this study reported more fringe 
benefits, includil1g professional memberships, leaves, and 
professional growth opportunities, through informal bargaining 
processes. 
An informal process or administrative team concept allows 
for greater interaction between groups. 
result in participants perceiving 
This interaction may 
higher degrees of 
involvement in managerial decision making as well as greater 
degrees of involvement in decisions which impact upon working 
conditions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The data from this study indicate that principals who 
have legal authority to bargain collectively do not perceive 
their working conditions to be significantly better than 
principals who cannot bargain. Only one of nine determinants 
of working conditions, autonomy, was found statistically 
significant (see Table XI, Chapter IV), and it was higher for 
non-bargaining principals. 
A major conclusion of this 
significant differences between 
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study is there are no 
Oregon and washington 
principals relative to working conditions. There are several 
factors which might contribute to the perceived lack of 
difference between the two groups of principals. The first 
is the bargaining level of the principals (see Table II, 
Chapter IV). There is little difference in the perceptions 
of principals in each of the three bargaining level groups -
formal, informal, and unilateral decision making. 
Principals' responses in both states reveal a similar pattern 
even though statutory authority for formal bargaining differs 
greatly in each state. 
Another factor which may contribute to the lack of 
significant differences between Oregon and Washington is the 
progressiveness of the educational systems in both states 
relative to level of bargaining. Both states' largest group 
of respondents were principals who had an informal level of 
bargaining. This "getting to yes" style of bargaining is 
coming into vogue for teacher negotiations as well as in 
administrative negotiations. The current trend is away from 
adversarial bargaining and there may be a comparable decline 
in interest in formal bargaining by principals. In the 1990' s 
administrator collective bargaining may not be the preferred 
strategy by principals. 
A third factor which may explain the similarities of both 
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principal groups is a satisfaction with current working 
conditions and a corresponding view that teacher groups are 
not continuing to make substantive gains in either salary or 
other welfare issues. The needs that have traditionally led 
principals to organize may not be there now (Barea, 1978) and 
job satisfaction may be at higher levels. As indicated in the 
study by Sweeney and Rowedder (1982), principals reporting 
greater satisfaction with a:3.laries and benefits were not 
strongly pro-union. This study, of Oregon and washington 
principals, concurs with the findings of Nasstrom and Pier 
(1983) and Morris (1985), who concluded principals who have 
statutory authority to collectively bargain do not perceive 
their working conditions to be significantly more positive 
than principals who do not have this authority. 
The findings indicate the level of collective bargaining 
has some effect on the principals' perceptions of working 
conditions but not at a statistically significant level. 
These conclusions, and those which follow, are drawn from the 
data which show that salary, involvement in decision making, 
job security, and fringe benefits were found to be 
statistically significant factors with regard to the 
principals' level of bargaining. 
The data indicates that principals who formally bargain 
have higher scores on adequacy of salary scales than the other 
two respondent groups. In support of the research conclusions 
by LeCesne (1980), Caldwell (1981), Sweeney and Rowedder 
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(1982), and Nasstrom and Pier (1983), there appears to be a 
positive relationship between the degree of formalized 
interaction between principals and their school boards 
relative to contractual items. This formalization results in 
a significantly more positive perception of salary adequacy. 
Principals perceive higher levels of involvement in 
decision making, job security, and fringe benefits through the 
informal bargaining process over the formal level. This may 
be attributed to the implementation of an "administrative 
team" concept and a shared power structure in which 
principals have greater latitude and involvement in decision 
making. The idea is to involve principals in more decisions 
including those which effect their working conditions. A less 
formalized model may also alleviate the adversarial 
relationships in collective bargaining (Caldwell and Paul, 
1983 and Kowalski, 1978), and make the school board and/or the 
superintendent more comfortable in joining forces with an 
administrative team. 
This "shared power" or "informal" structure may prove 
superior to the adversarial aspects of formal bargaining and 
make the achievement of a true administrative team possible. 
In Washington and Oregon, both the Confederation of Oregon 
School Administrators (COSA), Washington Association of School 
Administrators (WASA) and the Association of Washington School 
Principals (AWSP) are supporters of the administrative team 
concept. 
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Previous research on administrative collective bargaining 
has generally concluded that principals who are involved in 
formal or informal collective bargaining (whether or not this 
activity is permitted by state statute) have more positive 
perceptions of their working conditions. This study also 
found mean scores on working conditions sub-scales for 
principals in the informal and formal bargaining groups to be 
higher than those for principals in the unilateral decision 
making group. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Policy 
Many legislative bodies are currently debating the issue 
of collective bargaining for administrators. Legislators are 
evaluating collective bargaining statutes and their 
implementation. The findings of this study provide data which 
can inform those responsible for the development of such 
statutes. The data may be persuasive for the development of 
statutes which insure that the statutes have language that 
focuses on interactive practices which will encourage school 
boards, superintendents and principals to employ a two-way 
communication strategy for decision making wi th regard to 
working conditions. An administrative team model could 
enhance professionalism for all groups involved in educational 
decision making. 
Local policy makers could establish this type of policy 
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at the local level within their school board policies and 
procedures to insure involvement by principals in matters that 
relate specifically to working conditions. An effective 
administrative team model may have an even broader scope to 
include a "shared power model" which could be truly 
representative of a participatory management model. 
Practice 
Those responsible for implementing policy, the 
practitioners, could benefit from this study's findings that 
the formalization of collective bargaining may not be as 
important as the actual practice of involvement of principals 
in establishing procedures in the area of job security and the 
types of benefits principals' receive. As Caldwell (1981) 
found in his study, the actual process through which working 
conditions are determined is more crucial in job satisfaction 
than the actual level of the conditions. 
Theory 
Principal involvement is establishing conditions of work 
is based on the idea of meeting the basic needs of principals 
so that they are able to achieve the maximum effectiveness 
permitted by their abilities and skills (Lutrin, 1985). When 
school boards establish with principals the means of openly 
discussing and acting on relevant concerns, it enhances the 
principals' sense of professional recognition (Caldwell and 
Paul, 1983). 
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According to Blau (1978) in the exchange theory, 
collective organization mobilizes power. Also, a person or 
group who commands services other's need, attains power over 
others. If there is an imbalance in the power level, there 
will be an uneven exchange between the groups. School boards, 
by not anticipating in advance the social regards or needs 
which principals will or can reciprocate in the exchange 
relationship, inevitably will bring error and uncertainty into 
the relationship of the groups (Blau, 1978). Blau's exchange 
theory (1978) can be used as a conceptual model for collective 
bargaining. This exchange theory can be referred to as the 
"give and take" of services in exchange for wages and 
benefits. The assumption is that people seek to adjust social 
conditions to achieve their ends. Specific forms of social 
organization are the result of the exchange process (Blau, 
1978) • Union organization is an example of this form of 
social organization. The patterns of conduct by individuals 
or groups and their relations readjust through the process of 
exchange and competition according to Blau (1978). This 
pattern of conduct could be the informal or formal process of 
collective bargaining. 
Providing a model which encourages discussion and input 
by the school board, superintendent and principals before 
final decisions with regard to working conditions are made 
helps avoid an imbalance in power lev~ls. Subsequently, both 
groups can experience gratification. 
Limitations 
There were limitations 
corrected in future studies. 
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on this study which may be 
First, sampling for the study 
was limited to a survey of a specific geographical population. 
Therefore, it is recommended this study be replicated using 
a larger number of Oregon and Washington school principals in 
order to have more generalizable data about principals' 
perceptions of their working condi tions. Second, in the 
secondary analysis, a planned comparison could be made between 
the three levels of bargaining to further determine 
significance between the formal bargaining group and the 
informal bargaining group. This planned comparison can only 
be done if certain data are known ahead of time and the 
statistical analysis is planned. 
1. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings 
survey of 
of this 
collective 
study become part 
bargaining statutes 
of a 
for nationwide 
principals. There are elements in this study and in previous 
studies that are consistent. However, future studies might 
show different trends if, for example, principal collective 
bargaining studies were conducted in each state. 
2. Studies examining successful labor processes, other 
than collective bargaining, are needed. A review of the 
literature indicates principals want involvement in decision 
making about working conditions, but no where is it cited that 
r------
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the vehicle must be formal collective bargaining. There may 
be other labor relations models utilized by school board 
members which take into account the needs of principals, 
school boards, teachers, students, and parents. These models 
may be more effective than the existing adversarial collective 
bargaining model. The data for this study revealed a greater 
number of respondents were involved in informal types of 
bargaining. Both groups chose strategies other than formal 
bargaining, whether or not they had access to more formal 
procedures. Therefore, a question for further research could 
be, "If formal collective bargaining is not the best means of 
setting working conditions for school principals, what model 
or process best meet the needs of this professional group?" 
3. Many Oregon respondents reported they were involved 
in some aspect of collective bargaining even though there is 
no statutory authority for these bargaining activities. 
Oregon principals' knowledge of collective bargaining statutes 
and their perceptions of administrative collective bargaining 
needs further probing. A descriptive study of Oregon 
principal's perceptions of formal collective bargaining and 
the process they use for categorization needs to be conducted. 
Such a study would help clarify the bargaining processes being 
employed throughout the state. 
4. A study designed to compare the roles of middle 
managers in other fields and school principals may provide 
insight into the human relations aspect of future 
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organizational dynamics in education. such a study could be 
designed to answer the research question "00 middle managers 
in fields other than education have a model they use to reach 
agreement on issues specific to their working conditions? 
Does this model involve the middle managers in the decision 
making process?" 
5. The demographic data for this study was only tested 
for significance with regard to the independent variable of 
bargaining (Washington) and non-bargaining (Oregon) 
principals. A further investigation of these factors with 
regard to the nine determinants of working conditions may 
provide some interesting findings. 
6. Finally, a further investigation into the 
reasonableness of changing state statutes to move toward an 
administrative team concept or shared power model, relative 
to collective bargaining of principals' working conditions, 
is needed. An initial study to survey legislators about their 
attitudes regarding collective bargaining and administrative 
team structures would be an initial step in this line of 
inquiry. The education profession could benefit from 
information about the "reasonableness" of proposing any kind 
of change in statutes in either Oregon or Washington. 
Further study should also seek to identify those 
districts which use an administrative team model with regard 
to conditions of work rather than a formal collective 
bargaining model. This should be done after pin-pointing the 
123 
contextual factors, as well as the structures and processes 
which influence principals in districts using this model. The 
investigator could work with COSA, WASA and AWSP to develop 
legislative proposals for shaping administrative team 
statutes. 
This 
comparing 
SUMMARY 
chapter provides 
bargaining and 
a summary of the research 
non-bargaining principals' 
perceptions of working condi tions. The study' s findings 
indicate non-bargaining principals (Oregon) perceive autonomy 
at higher levels than do bargaining principals (Washington). 
Oregon principals when compared to washington principals 
perceive themselves as having greater authority over teachers 
and school building activities. All the other determinants 
of working conditions were not found to be statistically 
significant. Overall, the existence of formal collective 
bargaining was found to have no significant impact on 
principals' perceptions of their working conditions. 
A secondary data analysis found the determinants of 1) 
salary, 2) decision making 3) job security, and 4) fringe 
benefits to be significant relative to the level of 
bargaining. Principals who formally bargain perceive higher 
levels of satisfaction with the adequacy of their salary 
levels than do those principals who informally bargain or who 
accept unilateral decisions. 
124 
Principals who bargain informally perceive higher levels 
of involvement in decision making, job security, and fringe 
benefits than do principals who formally bargain or accept 
unilateral decisions. These principals report they are 
involved in setting policy more often or to greater degrees 
than the other two respondent groups. They also perceive 
higher levels of job security and fringe benefits. The other 
five determinants of working conditions were not found to be 
statistically significant relative to the level of bargaining. 
Overall, the effect of the level of bargaining with regard to 
working conditions of principals was not significant. 
This study's major finding that principals in Washington, 
who by statute are allowed to bargain collectively, do not 
perceive they enjoy significant advantages regarding working 
conditions when compared with Oregon principals, who do not 
have collective bargaining rights. This major finding has 
powerful implications for the collective bargaining movement 
and for principals in the Northwest. 
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APPENDIX A 
TRANSMITTAL LETTERS 
Dear Colleague: 
12213 S. E. Riveridge Drive 
Vancouver, WA 98684 
February 2, 1988 
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hhat you are about 
before ••• however, X 
neans. PLEASE READ ON! 
to read 
believe, 
you 
the 
have read many times 
end will justify ~bg 
I aD a Diddle school principal in the Camas School District, in 
CaQas, washingt~n, and a doctoral student at portland State 
University. I aD doing research with Or. John Heflin, my 
advisor, in the area of "Collective Bargaining for Educational 
Administrators: Oregon and Washington principals' Perceptions of 
horking Conditions." 
=:nclosed you .,ill find a brief questionnaire. Ox ai:l requesting 
you take 10 to· 15 Dinutes out of your busy schedule to complete 
it. You:: candid response is greatly needed if. this research is 
to be successful. I have enclosed a self addressed, stamped 
envelope :for your convenience and would ver}· J:iuch appreciate your 
return by February 12. 
Since there are so~e delicate issues addressee, all returns will 
be :':ept 1n the strictest. confidence. Upon co::pletiun of the 
. s-:udy , i! you WOUld. be interested. in seeing· a . sn-;;an.- C?f the 
resul-:s, ! lOould be happy to share this ",ith you. Si&:ply d=op ~e 
a nc~e rs~esting this information with your na::e anc address and 
:~~ ~ill receive a copy. 
O£cur prc::pt return of this questionnaire is crucial to the 
success of cy study. Your completion e: the enclosed 
ques~ion::aire is indication of your consent to parcicipate in 
this stu=v. I have enclosed a Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream 
certifica~e as a "thank-you" and a token of ny appreciation for 
your assistance in this research project. 
!:o· ... , doesn't this end justify the means. (If you are not totally 
satisfie:, please return the coupon for a full refund.) 
!"han:': yc:: for your cooperation. 
~~J&., 
?atricia A. Boles 
=:nclcsurss: Business Card 
Baskin-Robbins Gift Certificate 
February 12, 1988 
Dear Colleague, 
Just a reminder that I have not as yet received the 
survey I sent you on February 2. Your input is 
greatly needed for a successful study of 
"Principals I Perceptions of Working Conditions in 
regards to Collective Bargaining in Oregon and 
Washington. 
If you have already mailed your survey, thank you! 
I realize what a busy time of year this is and how 
stressful one more ~equest can be. If you have not 
done so, would you please complete and return the 
questionnaire as soon as possible. The survey is 
short and should take very little of your time. 
I am very grateful for your help. 
~:~:~~ 
Patricia Boles 
Doctoral candidate, Portland State University 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Instructions for completing questionnaire 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine 
working conditions within your district and the degree of 
your satisfaction with these conditions. 
1. state i~ which you work (check one) 
Washington 
Oregon 
2. School district classification (check one) 
Urban 
Suburban 
Small Town 
Rural 
3. School district student population (check one) 
o - 999 
1000 - 4999 
5000 - larger 
4. Date Of Birth 
5. Sex (check one) 
Male 
Female 
6. Number of years in public school administration 
7. Years of classroom teaching experience 
8. Position (check one) 
Secondary Principal 
Middle Level Principal 
Elementary Principal 
~--
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Please check the category/categories which best describe the 
process which results in determining salaries and working 
conditions for principals in your district: (Please check 
only one) 
Formal collective bargaining between the 
superintendent and representatives of 
middle management. 
_____ Formal collective bargaining between 
representatives of the school board and 
principals 
Informal meetings between the superintendent 
/board and principals 
_____ unilateral decisions by the superintendent/board 
communicated to principals 
_____ other (Please specify) 
Each of the following items makes a statement about 
administrative collective bargaining in the public schools. 
Please read each statement carefully and then mark according 
to the following scale: 
* Means 
1.88 1. 
4 - strongly agree 
3 - Agree 
2 - Disagree 
1 - Strongly 
Disagree 
Administrative collective bargaining negatively 
effects the administrator's relationship with the 
teachers. 
2.20 2. Administrative collective bargaining negatively 
effects the administrator's relationship with the 
superintendent. 
2.21 3. Administrative collective bargaining negatively 
effects the administrator's relationship with the 
school board. 
1.92 4. Administrative collective bargaining negatively 
effects the conditions of work for an 
administrator. 
1.90 5. Administrative collective bargaining negatively 
effects the control an administrator has over 
their job responsibilities. 
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Each item on this questionnaire makes a statement about the 
management in your schools. Please read each statement 
carefully. Then indicate the extent to which each stated 
condition actually exists in your school district, according 
to the following scale: 
* Means 
3.09 1. 
3.06 2. 
2.28 3. 
3.33 4. 
2.98 5. 
4 - To a large extent 
3 - To a moderate extent 
2 - To a slight 
extent 
1 - Not at all 
An effective communication system exists between 
and among all levels of the management team. 
Administrators meet periodically with the 
Superintendent to discuss their problems. 
Administrators meet periodically with school 
directors to discuss their problems. 
Administrators have adequate opportunities to 
attend state conferences or conventions. 
Administrators feel free to speak out at 
administrative meetings even if their views are 
contrary to the Superintendent or Board. 
2.78 6. There is wide involvement of administrators in the 
development of the school district budget. 
3.36 7. Administrators have an opportunity to make 
appropriate input to employment decisions 
concerning school district employees. 
3.30 8. Input from administrators is solicited as proposed 
administrative rules and regulations are being 
developed. 
2.80 9. Administrators are represented on the board's 
negotiating team. 
3.40 10. Job descriptions have been prepared for all 
administrators. 
3.17 11. The district conducts formal performance 
appraisals with the administrators on a regular 
basis. 
2.63 12. The district has a fair and logical procedure for 
determining salaries for administrators. 
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2.87 13. Salaries for administrators compare favorably with 
their counterparts in similar districts. 
3.00 14. The district has a fair and logical procedure for 
determining fringe benefits for administrators. 
2.96 15. Fringe benefits for administrators compare 
favorably with their counterparts in similar 
districts. 
3.68 16. Employment contracts have been provided for every 
administrator. 
3.17 17. Collective administrator contracts are not changed 
without mutual consent. 
2.64 18. The district has a staff development program for 
administrators. 
2.58 19. Administrators feel free to implement new plans or 
policies for their schools or program 
responsibilities without involving a 
superior. 
2.77 20. The district has defined, written hiring 
procedures for principals. 
1.93 21. A written defined grievance procedure for 
administrators is in place. 
3.50 22. There is a defined, written work year for the 
principals in the district. 
3.25 23. The district has a defined, written salary 
structure for the principals. 
2.75 24. Written procedures defining leaves of absence have 
been developed for all administrators. 
3.40 25. Administrators meet periodically with the 
superintendent to resolve problems. 
1.86 26. Administrators meet periodically with the school 
board to resolve problems. 
2.61 27. Administrators have adequate opportunities to 
attend national conferences or conventions. 
3.09 28. Administrators feel free to speak out at 
administrative meetings. 
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3.01 29. There is wide involvement of administrators in the 
development of their school's building budget. 
2.84 30. Administrators have an opportunity to make 
appropriate input to promotion decisions 
concerning school district employees. 
3.32 31. Administrators have an opportunity to make 
appropriate input to dismissal decisions 
concerning school district employees. 
2.83 32. Administrators have input to administrative job 
descriptions. 
COMMENTS: 
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR BARGAINING AND NON-BARGAINING 
PRINCIPAL'S PERCEPTION REGARDING THE NINE 
PRIMARY HYPOTHESES. 
Work Mult. Sq. Signf. Sum Mean 
Conditions R Mult. p=<.05 of Sq. 
R Sq. 
Salary .014 .000 0.869 
Formal Contracts .205 .042 0.015 2.165 2.165 
Antonomy .232 .054 0.006 4.163 4.163 
Power/Authority .053 .003 0.545 
Job Security .036 .001 0.681 
Fringe Benefits .036 .001 0.671 
Role Definition .026 .001 0.748 
Communication .035 .001 0.688 
Decision Making .118 .014 0.162 
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR PRINCIPAL'S LEVEL OF BARGAINING 
AND THE NINE SECONDARY HYPOTHESES. 
Work Mult. Sq. Sum Mean Signf. 
Conditions R Mult. of Sq. p=<.05 
R Sq. 
Salary .380 .144 11. 267 5.634 0.000 
Formal Contracts .028 .001 0.950 
Antonomy .186 .035 0.104 
Power/Authority .248 .061 3.542 1. 771 0.022 
Job Security .264 .070 4.131 2.066 0.013 
Fringe Benefits .247 .061 11.687 5.843 0.016 
Role Definition .230 .053 3.833 1.917 0.030 
Communication .073 .005 0.715 
Decision Making .293 .086 4.460 2.230 0.003 
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DISTRICT CLASSIFICATION AND 
SIGNIFICANT WORKING CONDITIONS. 
Mult. Sq. Sum Mean Signf. 
R Mult. of Sq. p=<.05 
R Sq. 
Primary Analysis 
Bargain/Non-Bargain 
Autonomy .253 .064 4.978 1.659 0.027 
Formal Contracts .278 .077 3.985 1.328 0.011 
Secondary Analysis 
Level of Bargaining 
Salary .388 .150 12.805 4.268 .000 
Role Definition .436 .190 16.187 5.396 .000 
Decision Making .253 .064 3.631 1.210 .028 
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DISTRICT SIZE AND SIGNIFICANT 
WORKING CONDITIONS. 
Mult. Sq. Sum Mean Signf. 
R Mult. of Sq. p=<.05 
R Sq. 
Primary Analysis 
Bargain/Non-Bargain 
Formal Contracts .228 .052 2.680 1.340 0.025 
Secondary Analysis 
Level of Bargaining 
Salary .363 .132 11.230 5.615 0.000 
Power/Authority .209 .044 2.816 1.409 0.055 
Role Definition .392 .153 12.985 6.493 0.000 
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ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: EFFECT OF DISTRICT CLASSIFICATION 
AND DISTRICT SIZE ON THE SIGNIFICANT WORKING 
CONDITION AREAS. 
Primary Analysis 
Bargain/Non-Bargain 
Autonomy 
Secondary Analysis 
Level of Bargaining 
Salary 
Decision Making 
Mult. 
R 
.318 
.490 
.345 
Sq. 
Mult. 
R 
.101 
.240 
.119 
Sum Mean Signf. 
of Sq. p=<.05 
Sq. 
3.284 3.284 0.012 
7.313 3.656 0.001 
2.205 0.003 
